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Abstract
The Antarctic continent and surrounding waters are the site
of a unique international dilemma.

Krill, a small shrimp-

like crustacean, is the focus of this problem.
major role in the short Antarctic food chain.

Krill playa
Marine fauna

in the area depend heavily on krill either directly or indirectly for their livelihood.

Krill are a main food item

for fish, squid, penguins, Crabeater Seals, Leopard Seals
and the Fin, Blue, Sei, Humpback, and Minke Whales.

Animals

such as the Killer and Sperm Whales and other seals are only
one step removed in the food chain.

Human interest in krill as a potential source of protein and
income has been on the increase.

Japan, the Soviet Union and

the Federal Republic of Germany are engaged in exploratory
fishing and the development of markets for krill.

Taiwan,

Chile, and the Republic of Korea plan to do the same.

Un-

fortunately, little 1s known about proper management techniques for a resource which occupies such a low and important
trophic level.

The problem is augumented by the fact that seven nations
(Australia, Argentina, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and
the United Kingdom) have laid claim to sovereignty over portions
of the Antarctic continent.

These seven states, along with

Belgium, Japan, Poland, South Africa, the Soviet Union, and

i
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the United States, are party to the present governing instrument for the Antarctic continent - The 1959 Antarctic Treaty.
The Treaty has effectively "arrested" the claims issue.
However,a possible international approach to krill management
is viewed by the seven claimants as a threat to their "sovereignty" over Antarctic territory.

states not bound by pro-

visions of the Treaty have expressed interest in benefit from
the krill harvest.

Differences of opinion over this juridical

issue will hinder any attempt at international management of
krill.

The potential krill harvest necessitates the development of
some mechanism for the purpose of rational management.

The

Antarctic Treaty does not treat the subject of commercial
exploration and exploitation and may be of little use in
krill management decisions.

The impact of the 1958 Geneva

Conventions on the Law of the Sea and of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text is also open to question.

Until the

status of the waters within 200 miles of the Antarctic continent is determined, the applicability of these international
agreements is subject to various interpretations.

The International Whaling Commission, Food' and ,Agricultural
Organization, and Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research
have been noticeably active with respect to Antarctic marine
living resources.

These organizations may play important

iii
roles within a new resource management regime.

Several

management approaches are available to the international
community.

Opinions differ, however, as to the most appro-

priate combination of states and organizations for a new
regime.

For most effective management, a new regime should

not be restricted to the thirteen Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, but should be open to all actively interested
nations.

States (most especially less-developed-countries)

without the means to develop an Antarctic fishery or scientific
program may be represented through strong institutional relationships between the international organizations mentioned
and a new regime to be established.
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Chapter I
Introduction

This study pertains to the problem afinternational activity
in an area of political and ecological sensitivity, the
Southern Ocean.

Of specific concern is the question of

which group of states should have a voice in management of
Antarctic krill.

The niche filled by krill within the

ecosystem and its potential as a fishery is discussed.
Past international practice has been affected for the most
part by the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 which has maintained
a somewhat exclusive "club" of nations as the overseers of
Antarctic activity.

However, states not party to the 1959

Treaty are becoming interested in the possible benefits of
a krill fishery.

A major point of contention evolves from the fact that seven
nations have laid claim to sovereignty over sections of the
Antarctic continent.

Several of these nations assume that

they also have exclusive rights over the %ishery resources
within 200 miles of the coast.

The Antarctic Treaty has

put the juridical question in a temporary limbo by refusing
to recognize or not recognize any of the claims.
of the various claims has yet to be resolved.

The status

Therefore,

the status (i.e. high seas, exclusive economic zones, contiguous
zones, territorial seas, or internal waters) of the waters

1
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surrounding the continent is also open to question.

Since

the nature of the waters is undetermined, applicability of
the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the law of the Sea, the 1959
Antarctic Treaty, and the potential impact of the Informal
Composite Negotiating Text is also unsettled.

Tensions

between the territorial security envisioned by the claimants
and "freedom of the seas" advocated by the non-claimants
will be difficult to resolve.

The juridical problem plays

a significant role with respect to the questions of resource
acquisition and environmental protection.

Reference to high

seas within the Southern Ocean is illade throughout this study
with these points in mind.

Several international organizations (i.e. FAO, lWC, and SCAR)
carry out activities which are important with regard to
Antarctic marine living resources.

Discussion of the functions

of these various organizations shows that they will be important assets to rational management of Antarctic krill.
Four possible options open to the international community
are addressed.

These options are not exclusive, but were

chosen for their applicability and the fact that they are the
most widely discussed.

Conclusions concerning membership in

a regime for management of Antarctic krill are, thereby,
supported.

Chapter II
Krill as a Resource and its Place in the Ecosystem

General Antarctic Ecosystem

The Antarctic marine ecosystem may be defined both physically
and biologically.

The biological parameters are limited by

the distribution of Euphasia species (krill) and some penguins,
fish, seals and phytoplankton.

The physical boundary, charac-

terized by a steep temperature gradient (2-4 0 centigrade), is
the Polar Front or Antarctic Convergence which is dynamic and
found both north and south of 60° South.

Antarctic Surface

Water moves northward until it sinks beneath the less-dense
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Subantarctic Surface Water.

The area to

(See: Figure L)

the south of this convergence is much richer and more productive than the waters directly to the north.

This is due mainly

to the marked increase in nutrient concentrations to the south. 1
Many organisms interact with the Antarctic marine ecosystem,
but are not limited to the southern side of the Convergence.
The most notable group here is, of course, whales.

The nutrient-rich waters of the Southern Ocean support a wealth
of life.

Typical and generalized features of Antarctic organ-

isms are large body size, slow growth, and small number of
species.

These characteristic features have evolved in re"

sponse to the severe environmental parameters.

Marked season-

al changes and a short plant growing season are significant
factors in the survival of Antarctic species.

The productive
season is estimated to be about 120 days per year. 2

The Antarctic ecosystem is by no means closed or limited to
the area south of the Antarctic Convergence.

Carbon and nu-

trients are transported across the Convergence by whale, fish
and bird migrations.

All ecological niches appear to be fill-

ed within the Southern Ocean.

Green, in her 1977 report to

the Department of State, noted several special characteristics

1Sayed Z. EI-Sayed, "Biology of the Southern Ocean,"
Oceanus 18:(SummeF~1975), p. 41.
2I bi d., p, 41.
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of the Southern Ocean which are not shared by other marine

ecosystems.

The

extr~me

seasonality in light and ice dic-

tate the short but very intense growing season.

Pack ice

extends further north in the winter, thereby, covering and
uncovering krill.

The edge of the ice cover seems to be an

area of intense ,biological activity.

Behavioral mechanisms

of organsisms involved have adapted to these seasonal stresses so they may survive throughout the year.

The Southern

Ocean may not be as productive as originally supposed, since
early observations were made during the summer.

On a per

square meter per year basis, the Antarctic waters may not be
much more productive than other oceans.

However, the short

food chains increase the amount of fixed Carbon which is transferred to the carnivores.

No group of organisms is more than

three steps removed from phytoplankton in the food chain,
therefore, the Antarctic waters support an unusually dense
population of carnivores.

The most significant aspect of the

ecosystem is the dependence of many predators on one prey
species (krill).

This unusual dependence on one prey species

is possible because each predator consumes a different segment
of the krill population and the fact that krill occur in such
large quantities.

Predators feed in different geographic lo-

cations, at different times of the year and on different size
classes of krill. 3
3Green, Katherine A., "Role of Krill in the Antarctic
Marine Ecosystem," (December 1977), p. c-14 in u.S. Department
of State, Final Environmental Impact Statement for a Possible
Re ime for Con ervation of Antarctic Livin Marine Resources,
June 1978): Appendix E.

6
Krill

Krill, the dominant herbivore, has its name derived from the
Norwegian translation for "whale food".

Krill playa very im-

portant role since they are the main food item for many fish,
s~uid,

penguins, seals and baleen whales.

Most other Antarctic

species are only one step removed from krill in the food chain.
Krill have a relatively long life span, requiring several years
to reach maturity.

They are classified as zooplankton or mi-

cronekton.

Euphasia superba, Euphasia crystallorophias, and
Thysanoessa macura are the main krill species. 4 The predominant species and the only one of commercial interest is E.superba.
E. superba is rarely found north of the Convergence, but is abundant to the south.

Some krill, such asE;valentiniand ..

E. crystallorophias, do occur north of the convergence. 5
E. superba is a small (maximum length approximately 60 mm)
crustacean with an average weight of 1.4 grams.

Growth acceler-

ates during spring and summer and slows during the rest of the
year.

On the average, krill grow to

in weight during their first year.

22~-ln

length and 300 mg

By the end of their second

year, length averages 48mm and weight approximately 1 gram.
Age of sexual maturity and life span are not yet resolved. 6

4 I bi d . , p. C-2.

5Sayed, p. 42.
6Several larval stages are passed through during growth.
E. superba transcends 12 different stages. Wilson, Richard B. ,
lOAn Evaluation of Possible United States Involvement in an Antarctic.Krill Fishery," Masters Thesis, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, (August 1976): p. 16.

?
Krill apparently do not breed until the beginning of their
third or fourth year and may breed for more than one season.?
These life span questions will affect the entimates of maximum
sustainable yield since the proportion of the population capable of reproducing in one year cannot yet be determined.

Krill has a circumpolar distribution, but is by no means distributed symetrically throughout the Southern Ocean.

Portions

of the ocean are heavily populated while other sectors are
barren. 8 (See: Figure II.). The Scotia and Weddell Seas are
regions of great abundance and the only known krill spawning
areas.

Because these zooplanktxn are concentrated (for some

unknown reason) in swarms, large animals can catch enough to
feed themselves and man may feasibly harvest them.

Swarms seem

to average 40 X 60 meters in size, but have been recorded as
large as 600 meters.

They occur at varying depths down to a

depth of about 100 meters. 9

Dense enough to aiscolor the sea

water, they may be easily spotted from a ship or by satellite
remote sensing. 10 Other forms of zooplankton (i.e. copepods,

7Green, p. C-24.
8Major concentrations are found in the coastal East Wind
Drift, the Weddell Drift, the Bransfield Strait and to the east
of South Georgia Island. Wilson, p. 26.
9u. s . Department of State, Final Environmental Im~act Statement for a Possible Regime for Conservation of Antarct1c Living
Mar1ne Resources, (June 1978): p. 25.
_ 10sayed, p. 43. Color reported for the swarms are yellow,
ochre ,brown, brick and red. The vertical dimension of the
patches does not usually exceed 2 meters. Wilson, p. 17.

8
Principal concentrations of Antarctic krill.
Arrows indicate major water currents
(From Marr, 1962).
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amphipods and chaetognaths) may be of equal or greater biomass
than krill, but seem to be utilized by predators to a much
lesser degree than krill.

This may be due to the fact that

krill exhibit the swarming behavior, but may also be a misinterpretation due to lack of sufficient knowledge of the Antarctic ecosystem. 11

Accurate estimates of krill biomass are not yet available,'
partially because of insufficient sampling techniques.

Krill

are strong swimmers compared to most zooplankton, so normal zooplankton collecting nets are not adequate.

The high speed

trawls used in fishing for krill are the most appropriate
method of sampling.

Unfortunately. these have not been used

over a wide enough area to provide feasible estimates.
~warming

The

behavior of krill makes extrapolation to the entire

ecosystem very difficult since their distribution is extremely
patchy.

Because the krill estimates are based on speculation

rather than quantitative data, they are not reliable.
ble estimates may never be available.

Relia-

However, an estimated

standing stock range of 250 to 600 million tons and an annual
production rate (as opposed to the harvestable amount)of JOO
million tons are considered workable quantities since they are
compatible with Antarctic phytoplankton production rates. 12
Estimates of phytoplankton standing stock and production are
1lGreen. p. C-14.
12 I bi d., p. C-15,16.

10
derived from annual average production values for a small
region extrapolated to the whole Southern Ocean.

The caveat

here is that conversion ratios and conversion factors are littIe more than intelligent guesses.

Thi3 coupled with large

variations in the estimates of total Southern Ocean primary
production and the proportion of grazing attributed to krill
results in a wide range of estimates. 13 The biomass of other
Antarctic zooplankton is estimated to be the same as krill,
but reliable estimates of non-krill stocks are also lacking.

Total predation on krill by fish, squid, birds, seals and
whales is estimated at 330 million tons per year. 14 The amount
of krill taken by whales (even though they are not the major
consumers) plays a significant role in the question of krill
harvest.

The argument that krill are in overabundance because

of the decline in the whale population

~nd

may, therefore,

be harvested with relative impunity, is no longer considered
valid by scientists.

In its simplest form, this scheme calls

for man to harvest whale's krill consumption in 1900 minus
whale"s krill consumption in the 1970's.

Then, the argument

goes, food availability for other krill consumers will be at
least as good as it was in 1900 and the whales wilL be as well
off or better per capita than in 1900.

Supposedly, this will

not cause a reduction in the whale population.

On the other

IJEverson, Inigo, The Southern Ocean - the Living Resources
of the Southern Ocean, UNDP/FAO, Southern Oceans Fisheries Program', Rome, GLO/SO/77/1 (September 1977) : p.123.
14Green, p. C-24.

11

hand, their numbers may cease to increase.
reasons that this is not reliable logic.
exactly replace the wnales as a predator.

There are several
First, man cannot
Second, the eco-

system may have already adjusted to the lowered whale population.

The available krill may have caused an increase in the

seal and penguin populations.

Once a large commercial krill

harvest is in operation, it will displace some predators.
Some argue that population levels will return to what they were
when the whale levels were higher.

This mayor may not be so·

It is possible that the ecosystem is in general equilibrium
with all stocks at their present levels.

Population levels

for fish, squid, birds and seals during the era of whale abundance are not known. 15 Fairly reliable estimates of the past
whale population do exist.

A century ago the numbers of baleen

whales (blue, fin, sei, minke, humpback, and southern right
whales) totaled about one million with a biomass of about 43
million metric tons.

Currently, the biomass is approximately
one seventh of the initial biomass. 16 Estimates of sustainable

krill harvest range from 70 to 150 million tons per year.

A

harvest of 150 million tons would replace nearly one half of
the predators and have a drastic effect on the ecosystem.
Green suggests that a more plausible estimate should be 30 to
60 million tons per year with the larger value less likely to
be sustainable over a long period of time.

It has also been

suggested that predators be harvested in proportion to krill

15Green, p. C-25.
16 Sayed, p. 24.

12
harvested, but sustainable yields of seals, birds, fish and
squid cannot be determined due to lack of data. 17

Since the catastrophic decline of the baleen whale (those
with no teeth that must strain their food from the water)
population, (Sees Figure

III~

krill seem to be the only liv-

ing marine resource of sizeable quantity which may be feasibly harvested from Antarctic waters.

It has been known for

many years that krill exist in large amounts.

Only in the

mid 1960's, when the baleen whale stocks greatly declined
due to overharvesting, did interest in krill commercial exploi tation begin to rise.

Fueling this interest .waa the

recent decline in North Atlantic Herring, Peruvian Anchovies,
Gulf of Mexico shrimp, and the defunct California sardine fishery.18

Exploratory fishing for krill has been carried out by

the U.S.S.R., Japan, Chile, Federal Republic of Germany,
Poland, Norway, Taiwan, German Democratic Republic, Spain,
and Korea. 19 Reports of hourly catches have seen an upper
limit of 10 tons with conventional stern trawlers.
suggest that one ton per hour is feasible.

The Soviets

The Norwegians have

designed a system to process up to five tons per hour.

During

eighty days of fishing, the Japanese recently harvested 1400
tons or about 3/4th tons per hour. 20
17Green, p. c-26.
18sayed, p. 47.
19U• S• Department of State., Final ErS, p. 35.
20Wilson, pp. 45-46.

13
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Source: The Polar Times, (June 1977) p. 10.
Copyright 1977 by the American Polar Society
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Krill may be the largest (by volume and weight) marine living
resource to be left relatively unexploited by man.

As a

source of income and protein, it has great potential.

Table

I shows the high value of krill as a source of nutrition.
Note the high concentrations of protein and Vitamin A.

The

protein capacity is comparable to beef steak, shrimp and lob·
ster.

A major difficulty encountered with respect to a successful
krill harvest is found with the rapid decomposition of the
body after death.

Some sort of processing must occur immediate-

ly upon recovery.

Freezing, the most common method, is not

adequately effective.
ways.

Krill may be processed in different

The Soviets initially processed krill into feed meal,

but this meal did not preserve well.

They have now turned to

the production of a krill paste for human consumption.

The

paste is marketed as an additive for cheese or butter, or may
be mixed with mayonnaise as a salad dressing or a stuffing.
Krill Protein Concentrate is another alternative.

The con-

centrate is reported to contain close to 75% crude protein an~
may prove to be an excellent food additive. 21 The Japanese
have begun exploratory processing of krill into a liquid protein.

The shells are first separated and saved for fish meal.

The end product has a protein level of 42%.

The Japanese have

21Since krill have not been marketed as a food in the U.S.,
the attutudes and pOlicies of the Food and Drug Administration
should be considered. In the FDA requirements, special emphasis is given to a seafood's perishability and the need for rapid
application of preservative measures after harvesting. The
rapid rate of krill decomposition is cause for concern. The
quality of preservation should be a major factor in acquiring
government approvals for marketing. Wilson, p. 57.

15
Table~I~.~

: Chemical and Nutritive Properties of Krill.

Dry Matter Biochemical Breakdown
Protein - 49%
Ash
- 9.8%
Chitin - 2.5%
Lipid
24.6%

= 43.8%

saturated

32.8% monounsaturated
23.4% polyunsaturated

Net Weight Vitamin and Carotenoid Content
Vitamin A
Astaxanthin
Riboflavin
Vitamin B6
Ca-pantothenate
Niacin
Folic acid
Biotin
Vitamin B12

- 380 I.U./lOOgrams
3.12 mg/lOOg
1.58 myg
-

-

-

1.1 mg7g
15 mg/g
70 myg
66 mg/lOOg
10 mg/lOOg
16 mg/lOOg

Source: Wilson, Richard B., "An Evaluation of Possible U.S.
Involvement in an Antarctic Krill Fishery,' Thesis,
Massachusetts'Institute of Technology (August 1976):49,50.

19
also decided to market krill as krill.

The krill resembles

popular coastal shrimp in Japan and is sold at about one sixth
the price.

Krill, though, has a fish taste and smell which
may 'be too strong for the Japanese. 22 Specific products include: frozen cooked whole krill, dried krill, frozen attrition-peeled tail meats and frozen minced muscle for fish meat
balls.

In 1977, the Chileans test-marketed breaded krill sticks.

The success of this attempt is not yet known.

By-products such as oil and chitin are also of value.
oils have always been in high demand.

Marine

The best proof of this

is the demise of the whale population due to the quality of the
oil obtained from them.

Chitin has diverse uses.

Suggested

uses for chitin derivatives are: resins for chromotography,
metal recovery from waste water, paper strength additives and
textile dye binders.
of medical uses. 23

Chitin has also proven to have a variety

Krill harvesting has few, if any, precendents in fishery management.

Historically, species forming the upper levels of the

food chains have been harvested.

Krill, though, may be termed

a "foundation species" because it forms a base for the Antarctic food chain.

Therefore, indirect impacts to organisms of

higher trophic levels as well as direct impacts on krill are
22I bi d., pp. 51, 53-54.
23Th e Soviets claim to have shown that krill paste is
useful in treating ulcers. This is supported by the fact
that chitin (found in the exoskeleton) exhibits wound healing properties. Ibid., p. 51.

of concern.
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Scientists can sometimes predict impacts of con-

ventional species, but are far less certain about repercussions
of a large commercial krill fishery.

Basic ecosystem management concerns include the recovery rates
of the baleen whale populations, impact on the abundance of
harvestable fish and squid, and impact on penguin and seal populations.

The central position of krill within the Antarctic

food chain

indica~es

the importance of understanding the eco-

system interrelationships and dictates that there be some sort
of rational management scheme. It should be stressed that
existing data is lean.

Limits on commercial harvesting will

help protect the ecosystem from irreversible harm and also
provide some of the data needed.

Monitoring of dependent pop-

ulations will help in prediction of the impact on the ecosystem
as a whole. 24

Rational management of this resource is esse~

ual on both environmental and economic grounds.

It will be

best to negotiate a management regime while the fishery is in
its infancy, thereby, avoiding economic confrontation of great
magnitude.

Catch statistics from participating countries would

make predictions more accurate, but several countries have
indicated that such information will be made available to a
conservation organization and not before.

For an ecosystem

(versus a single species) approach to management, Everson suggests the following problems must first be answeredl
1)

Estimation of production at different trophic levels.

2)

Effects of changes in predatoron prey stocks or visa versa.

24Green, p. C-28.
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3)

Indirect effects of harvest by man. 25

Krill are distributed throughout the Southern Ocean.

Though

estimates of krill biomass and numbers vary, it is agreed that
they are very abundant.

The swarming behavior of the resource

along with advances in fishing technology and development of
markets make commercial exploitation feasible.

Krill may

be an excellent source of protein and income, therefore, the
danger exists that stock depletion may go beyond the level
healthy for the ecosystem.

The Antarctic ecosystem as a

whole is heavily dependent upon the niche filled by krill.
With this in mind, a management scheme is seen as necessary.
Problems exist with respect to the development of a rational
management plan due to lack of scientific data on krill and
also because of the unique nature of international Antarctic
history and politics.

25Everson, p. 123.

Chapter III
Legal

StatusoftheAnt~ic -

Background and Present Treaty

The present governing international instrument for the Antarctic
continent is the Treaty of December 1, 1959.

This Treaty supports

control of the continent in the hands of thirteen Consultative
states: Argentina, Australia, Belguim, Chile, France, Japan,
New Zealand, Norway, Poland (given Consultative status in 1977),
South Africa, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United
States.

Six other states have acceded to the Treaty, but do not

have Consultative status.

These include: Czechoslovakia (1962),

Denmark (1965), Netherlands (1967), Romania (1971), German Democratic Republic (1974), and Brazil (1975).
tions is known as the

This group of 19 na-

Antarctic Treaty Group (ATG).

The Federal

Republic of Germany and Uruguay have expressed interest in acceding to the Treaty.

History Of International Activity

Explorers have been sailing the Antarctic seas since the fifteenth
century.

Edmund Haley (discoverer of Haley's comet) led the

first scientific expedition to the area in 1700.

His mission,

under British Admiralty, was to calIon as many islands as pos~ble

and measure magnetic declination.

so never touched upon the mainland.

He was stopped by ice,

Early explorers of the

Southern Ocean include Captain James Cook who made several voyages with Sir Joseph Banks 1 (1768-71), and with William Wales and
1An eminent natural historian.
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Willaim Bayly2 (1772-75).

Other noted explorers include:

Russian Admiral Thaddeus Belingshausen (1819-21), English
sealers George Powell (1821) and James Weddell (1823), and
Naturalist James Eights of Albany who sailed with American
Captains Palmer and Pendleton (1829).3

As far as records reveal, the first landing on the mainland
was by United states sealing Captain John Davis on 7 February
1821.

The first scientific expedition to 'winter over' was

headed by· Belgian Lieutenant Adrien de Gerlache.

His party

earned this distiction by being 'frozen in' from 1897-99.

The

first deliberate 'over winter' expeditions were led by Sweden's
Otto Nordenskjold and Britain's Robert F. Scott from 1901-04.
Attempts to penetrate the interior began with an abortive attempt
to reach the South pole by English Lieutenant Ernest Shackleton
between 1907-09.

The most tragic figure in the Antarctic history

is British Captain Scott who wanted more than anything to be
the "discoverer" of the South Pole.

He returned to the Antarctic

in 1910 and reached the pole on 17 January 1912, only to perish
with his entire expedition on the return trek.

All of his effort

brought him in second, since the Norwegian party of Roald
Amundsen arrived at the pole on 14 December 1977 and returned
safely. 4

2Astronomers from the Greenwich Observatory.
3Deacon, Sir George, "Southern Ocean Exploration," Oceanus
18 (Summer 1975): p. 2.
4Hayton, Robert D., "The Antarctic Settlement of 1959,"
American Journal of International Law 54 (1960): p. 350.
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Most of the Consultative Parties have some history of Antarctic
involvement.

England initiated a series of "Discovery Expedi-

tions" in 1925.

United States interest in the Antarctic dates

from the early part of the 19th century with the 1838-42 expedition of Lieutenant Charles Wilkes.

American interest took

another upswing in 1928 with the beginning of the Byrd Expeditions and the work of Sir Hubert Wilkins.

The Japanese, during

the season of 1911-12, carried out their only expedd t i on prior
to the International Geophysical Year (IGY).

German aerial map-

ping efforts in 1938-39 were led by Captain Alfred Ritscher.
From 1939-42, the United States operated an Antarctic Service
on a major scale which was abandoned because of World War II.
After the war (1946-47), the United States Navy organized the
largest pre-IGY United States expedition. 5 Argentina held annual
relief voyages to a meteorological station in the South Orkneys
beginning in 1904, but their first expedition was in 1942. Britain
began her Falkland Islands Dependencies Surveys in 1943.

The

Chileans entered the picture in 1947 with their first expedition.
The French first discovered the Adelie Coast by a 1837-40 voyage by Captain D'Urville, but did not revisit this area until
1950.

1911-14 saw the "Australasian Antarctic Expedition."

New Zealand had been used as a point of departure for the British,
but came into the picture on their own with the British-Australian-

5U. S• Department of St;:.te Announcement, "Twelve Nations Sign
Treaty Guaranteeing Nonmilitarization of Antarctica and Freedom
of Scientific Investigarion," in U. S. Congress, House, Committee
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Fish and Wildlife Miscellaneous
Part 1. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife
Conservation and the Environment on H.R.
4, 95th Cong., 1st
session, 1977: p. 32 •
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6

New Zealand Antarctic Research Expedition of 1929-31.

Between

1908 and 1946, seven of the Consultative Powers (Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom)
laid claim to pie slice sections of the Antarctic.

The claims

of Argentina, Chile and the United Kingdom overlap. (See: Figure IV.)
The United States, Soviet Union, Belgium, South Africa and Japan
have refrained from making any claims or recognizing existing
claims.

The United States is the only nation consciously active

during this pre-International Geophysical Year (1957-58) period
which has made no national claim to a portion of the Antarctic
continent.

Among the claimant states, the potential for conflict, especially
between Britain, Argentina and Chile was on rapid rise.

Realiz-

ing the intensity of the situation, the United States Department
of State in 1948 approached the seven nations concerned with a
conference proposal aimed at internationalization.

The seven

were so adamant about not dropping their claims that the idea
was shelved.

Shortly afterwards the Soviet Union wisely demanded

full participation in any Antarctic settlement.

The matter drift-

ed for several years until proposed for discussion at the United
Nations in 1956 by India. 7

The Indian representative proposed

inclusion of the Antarctic question on the provisional agenda
of the United Nations General Assembly.

He hoped for an agree-

ment of all nations that the area be used for the welfare of the

6Hayton, p. 351.

7I bi d . , p. 352.
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whole world.
'~

Prior to the twelve nation Antarctic Treaty

Conference, India urged.that the United Nations should have a
chance to comment and offer suggestions on participation by nonsignatory governments in whatever regime provided. 8 The negative
reactions from states active in the Antarctic was successful
in stifling these attempts at outside control.

During the mid 1950's, attention was also turned to the potential for Antarctic contribution to scientific research.

The uni-

queness of this virgin territory along with its resource poten-·
tial stimulated the initiation of much scientific inquiry.

The

International Geophysical Year (IGY), was an eighteen month program dating from 1 July 1957 to 31 December 1958 and was designed to promote international scientific cooperation. The· IGY
brought to light the fact that the 'cold war' could be extended
to the Antarctic.

Though activities during this period were to

be non-political, nations became visibly apprehensive about
the sector claims.

Pressure was on governments to take steps

to insure national rights in the area and at the same time uphold the freedom of scientific inquiry.

Nearly all IGY par-

ticipants in the Antarctic agreed to a one year extention of
scientific cooperation.

The United states Department of state

in 1958, once again realizing the future implications of the situation, undertook an extensive study of the Antarctic problem. 9
8International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources (IUCN), "Notes on the Proposed Convention on the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine living Resources (Draft),"
(27 June 1978): p. 13.
9 Hayton, p. 353.
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Antarctic Treaty

In the spring of 1958, President Eisenhower announced that the
United States had invited eleven other nations (Argentina. Australia. Belgium. Chile. France, Japan. New Zealand. Norway.
Union of South Africa. the Soviet Union and United Kingdom) to
a conference in Washington.

For various reasons the conference

did not begin until ten months after official termination of
the IGY.

The conference was organized into two working groups:

Committee I to deal with scientific matters and Committee II to
deal with legal and political matters. 10 The final document of
fourteen articles was signed at Washington on 1 December 1959
and entered into force on 23 June 1961. (See: Annex I.)

The Antarctic Treaty is oriented toward peaceful continuance of
scientific cooperation (Articles I and II).

Article III

promotes international cooperation in scientific investigations.
Scientific observations. results and personnel are to be freely
exchanged.

This has not been the case with exploration of

krill resources.
data.

Nations have been reluctant to share catch

Krill. though. may not fall within the purview of the

Antarctic Treaty.

This point will be clarified later in the

study.

The Treaty provides for the arrest of the claims issue (Article
IV).

This was an essential ingredient for acceptance of the
10 I bi d .• p. 358.
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Treaty by the twelve original Consultative powers.

Article IV

is of special interest because of the way it shoves the issue
of territorial claims into what must be a temporary purgatory.
Despite the apparent freeze of the claims issue, the realization
that this jurisdictional split must someday be reconcilled has
had important influence over cooperative habits among the Antarc-

tic Treaty Parties.

Claimants and non-claimants are not much

nearer agreement today than they were in 1959.
sion may have widened.

In fact the divi-

The United States continues to maintain

its policy of non-recognition of claims.

Some nations (i.e.

Chile and Argentina) have become even more adamant in their
stances.

Before signing the 1959 Treaty, both of these states

proclaimed 200 mile zones of national jurisdiction off of their
respective claims.

No other claimants have followed this example.

Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty may be interpreted as prohibiting, subsequent to signing, the establishment of such zones. 11
Article V prohibits nuclear explosions and disposal of radio- .
active wastes.

Article VI outlines the physical boundary of
--"

the Antarctic Treaty area as "the area south of 60 0 South Latitude, including all ice shelves."

Nothing in the Treaty is to

"affect the rights ••. of any state under international law with
regard to the high seas within that

are~,"

but the Treaty fails

to define how much of the sea south of 60 0 South is not high seas.

Article VII provides for the right of inspection of foreign
11 IUCN, p. 8.
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stations, installations and equipment.

Aerial observation may

be undertaken at any time over any area of the Antarctic.
is a first between the United States and Soviet Union.

This

Apparently,

the inspection system is to insure against unauthorized military
activity.

Article VIII maintains jurisdiction of a state over

its nationals anywhere on the Antarctic continent.

The Treaty also provides for states to keep abreast of the
international Antarctic situation by holding periodic consultative meetings. (Article IX)

These meetings provide an arena

for consideration of issues of common interest to Consultative
Parties.

It is relatively easy for a dissatisfied nation to

disassociate itself from the Treaty.

Any party state may with-

draw from the Treaty if its government fails to ratify an
amendment which was unanimously approved by the
parties.

cont~acting

So far, no state has withdrawn.

Article X maintains that no contracting party engage in any
activity contrary to the principles or

pur~~ses

Article XI provides for dispute settlement.

of the Treaty.

Disputes may be

referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) , but there
is no compulsory jurisdiction by the ICJ.

Article XII provides

for Treaty amendment by unanimous agreement on the contracting
parties.

Thirty years from the date the Treaty entered into

force, any of the party nations may call a review conference.
(23 June 1991)

A different decision-making procedure for amend-

ments will apply at this meeting.

If review conference

r----------------------------~---

-
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is called and amendments are agreed to by a majority of the
parties, a state not ratifying the changes within two years
is free to withdraw. 1 2 It is open to question whether the .
Antarctic Treaty will effectively survive until 1991.

Most

states seem to regard the Treaty as temporary and of no more
than thirty year duration.

Article XIII provides for accession to the treaty by any member
of the United Nations.

States

members by accession, which have

not qualified for representation in the Consultative meetings
are not represented at any stage.

This restriction may make

otherwise interested states reluctant to join; however, this protects directly interested states with Consultative status from
inactive states which may hold up

amendments.

Article XIV

maintains that the Treaty (done in English, French, Russian
and Spanish) shall be deposited in the archives of the United
States government.

Antarctic Claims

Briefly, the various claims are based on the following national
experiences.

Britain finds ground for a claim in the voyage

of Captain Cook in 1773.

Captain Cook was the first "official"

explorer sent by Britain, but British claims were not formalized
until 1908.

The original claims covered two-thirds of the Ant-

arctic continent.

Much of this was later ceded to New Zealand

12Zumberge, James H., "Mineral Resources and Geopolitics
i::1 Antarctica," American Scientist 67 (January-February 1979):
p

75·
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and Australia.

The 1923 cession of a mostly unexplored sector

constitutes the origin of New Zealand's claim.

Until 1957-

58, when they established an Antarctic base, New Zealand took
little interest in Antarctic territory.

The 1926 cession of

approximately one third of the Antarctic brought Australia into
the claims arena.
ed until 1954.

The first Australian station was not establish-

Chile delineated its claim in 1950.

Frior to

this time Chile has no substantial record of Antarctic activity,
but considers the territory as a natural extention of its southernmost province.
its 1939 claim.

Some Norwegian exploration and whaling preceded
The one Norwegian station maintained from 1958-

60 was abandoned and no year-round station has been established
since.

France holds that an alleged sighting of the Antarctic

coast in 1840 provides them with the right to control a portion
of its mainland.

The claim was not made until 1924 and not de-

lineated until 1938.
1957.

The first French base was established in

Argentina issued its claim in

19~5

after short

~ mai n t ena n c e

of a meteorological station on an island 400 miles removed from
the Antarctic mainland. 13
The methods of acquiring territory under international law remain unsettled, but five modes are of note here.

1) Contiguity

is the 'natural' extention of the geographic boundaries of a land
mass due to proximity.
New

'~aland

This argument is used by Chile, Argentina,

and Australia.

Some pUblicists maintain that this

is a dangerous theory since it may cause other Southern Hemi13Anonymous, "Thaw in International Law? Rights in Antarctica
Under the Law of Common Spaces," The Yale Law Journal 87 (March
1978 ) ~ p. 811.
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sphere states to lay claims, thus leading to more international
disruption. 14 South Africa (a non-claimant) has already defended this principle.

2) Discovery is historically the most

important method of acquiring territory.

After the 18th cen-

tury, discovery had to be followed by effective occupation.
The assertion of 'discovery

is used for Antarctic claims

by Australia, Britain, France and Norway.

The major challenge

to this theory's applicability to Antarctic territory is based
on the fact that there have been ·num. er ou s explorers of different nationalities.

3) Effective Occupation is defined as

the settlement of a territory belonging to no other state
(terra nullius).

Such a settlement must be made within a rea-

sonable time after discovery and assume a permanent character. 15
Effective occupation "perfects" the claim, but its meaning remains unclear.

How long must the settlemBnt be maintained? What

must be accomplished?
land?

How much control is needed over unoccupied

The Presidents and Cabinets of both Chile and Argentina

have made official visits to their respective sectors to help
reinforce their claims.

Documentation of births and marriages

on Antarctic territory has also been filed.
Is this going to aid their position or is it empty formality?
Some writers argue that the mobility of Antarctic scientists
makes effective occupation of the southernmost continent 'international' in nature.

It should also be noted that the population

of many Antarctic stations is seasonal and/or temporary. 4) Minimal
14 I bi d., p , 816.

15Von Glahn, Gerhard, Law Arnone: Nations - An Introd.uction
to Public International Law, (Macmillian Publishing Co.• Inc.
1976): p. 274.
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Con t r ol is a contigency theory advanced by claimamt states in the
event they cannot convince the international community of the
effective control argument.

According to this idea, less control

is required to sustain a claim in an uninhabited or sparsely
inhabited region.

The concept has been upheld in past cases of

the ICJ, but the majority of examples pertained to tiny islands
with little importance and none were subject to a multinational
treaty.16 5) The Sector theory was derived from Arctic claims of
the Soviet Union and Canada.

According to Van Glahn, it is doubtful that the theory represents a rule of international law. 1 7

Actually, it is not a theory but a manner of delimiting claims
based on other theories.

In any event, it is undermined by the

distance between the Antarctic and the claimants.

Application of

this theory has brought about incongruous results, leaving parts
of the Antarcxic unclaimed and parts claimed by three states.

:vhether or not these claims are based on proper international
legal doctrine is beside the fact that they are ill-advised from
the point-of-view of international social, economical and political interaction.

The world is in the midst of dymanic shifts in

political and economical realities as witnessed by the rise of
Arab nations and the New International Economic Order.

Inter-

dependence of states is on the rise as never before and there is
a worldwide interest in control of new lands and resources as seen
16Anonymous, pp.82C,822. An exception is the Eastern Greenland
arbitration between Norway and Denmark. Demnark won the decision
by the Permanent Court of International Justice. The basis of
the ruling was that claims to sovereignty over thinly populated
teni~o~ies requires lesser showing of control.
See: F. C.I.J.,
1933, Sere AlB, No. 53.
17 Von Glahn, p. 284.
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in regard to deep-seabed resources.

Hopefully, there is also a

mutual concern for the world environment. Antarctic claims by
single states have their validity undermined by historical
evidence (i.e. the amount of international activity within the
Southern Ocean and on the mainland)

One publicist argues that

they violate the historical pattern of international practice
and agreement in the Antarctic and rest on inadequate
application of various doctrines of international law.

18

No state other than the fellow claimants have recogr.ized any
Antarctic territorial claims.

Th e United Nations has taken

no position on the issue of Antarctic sovereignty.

Initiative

for such non-action may be founded in the realization that any
United Nations position may throw the whole Antarctic question
under the purview of the United Na t i on s Conference on the law
of the Sea (UNClOS).

This issue will be dealt with- in more

detail later in this study.

Questions as to whether the inter-

national principles of development of sovereignty apply t o the
Antarctic are a major focus in the establishment of any sort
of resource management regime for the

area~

The Antarctic Treaty is not the sole source of international
law for the Antarctic, though it is the most widely accepted
statement of principles applicable to the area.

2ven so, the

extent to which the Treaty supports various positions concerning
jurisdiction and resource management is open to debate.

The Treaty

neither recognizes nor fails to recognize claims of exclusive
18 k~onymous, p. 8e7.
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rights; therefore, controversy over the issue of jurisdiction

......

remains.

It is not the purpose of this paper to establish all

of the international legal pros and cons of the claims issue.
It should be understood, though, that the issue of jurisdiction
is a major point of contention which may have to be resolved
in order to provide for an effective and peaceful solution to
international management of Antarctic resources.

It may be

feasi bLe, to secure a management regim.e for krill and other Li. ving marine resources and at the same time skirt the jurisdictional problem.

This is due partially to the fact that, even

with the claims issue ·unresolved on the mainland, the Southern
Ocean may be accepted by the claimants to be high seas.

Chapter IV

1959 Antarctic Treaty
Resource Management and Environmental Protection

The Antarctic Treaty does not treat the subject of commercial exploration and exploitation.

It merely pro-

vides for the discussion of future measures to conserve
and preserve Antarctic living resources.

(See:

Article IX.)

In 1959 the resource question was less crucial and easily
avoided.

Today the potential for confrontation over this

issue is considerable and the krill harvest issue is
contributing to a breakdown of the present Antarctic power
structure.

There is a difference of opinion as to who

should have a say in the management of Antarctic marine
living resources.

Claimant states may feel they control

the resources in "their" sectors.

Non-claimant states,

on the other hand, are pressing for freedom of access to
the continent and surrounding waters as a whole.

The

Treaty has, in spite of this basic point of contention,
provided some mechanism of resource management and environmental protection.

A brief overview is in-order.

Agreed Measures

With respect to the considerations in Article IX, resource
management and environmental protection have always played
an important role in Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings.
The present 'rules' regarding the Antarctic ecosystem are
to be found in the Agreed Measures for Conservation of

34
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Antarctic Flora and Fauna which were recommended at the 3rd
Consultative Meeting.

(Brussels - 1964.)

(See:

Annex

11.)1

The important considerations provided for in the Agreed
Measures include:
1.

Overall protection of all native mammals other
than whales and birds.

2.

Special protection of rare or vulnerable species.

3.

Minimization of inadvertent harm to wildlife by
man's activities.

4.

A ban on the import of non-indigenous species
except by permit.

Neither krill nor fish will be specifically protected by
the Agreed Measures.

The area of applicability includes

only the continent and the pack ice.

The measures have not

yet been unanimously approved by the governments of the
Consultative Parties.

The United States recently passed

the Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978 (Pl95-541) for the
purpose of approving the Agreed Measures.
going through the ratification process.
problems in Japan have delayed the

Australia is
Domestic legal

ratif~~ation

process.

There are apparent Constitutional difficulties in Japanese
enforcement of provisions on persons other than its civil
servants.

The Agreed Measures have proved effective on

a voluntary basis, but will become legally binding as
soon as all party governments ratify them.

How will the

Agreed Measures influence the krill harvest or conservation
regime?

The major impact the Agreed Measures would have

lThese measures arose out of SCAR initiative and are of
an interim nature, pending ratification by all Treaty Powers.
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upon krill management concerns the possibility of land-based
processing stations, and inadvertent harm to wildlife by
the fishing activity.

8th Consultative Meeting

At the 8th Consultative Meeting (June 1975, Oslo), the
contracting parties resolved to try to find a solution to
the problem of possible commercial activity.

At that time,

Norway proposed that Treaty Parties consider the conservation
issue.

The United States offered to host an international

scientific conference on living resources of the Southern Ocean
to review existing knowledge and to propose future studies.
This conference was held in August of 1976 at

~oods

Hole,

Massachusetts with an attendance of 59 scientists from
14 countries. 2 Working within the Scientific Committee
on Antarctic Research (SCAR), a program labelled Biological
Investigation of Marine Antarctic Systems and Stocks (BIOMASS)
was developed to help lay a basis for understanding the
Antarctic ecosystem and provide s c i errt Lf'LciLnt'o rrna t.i on
needed for later decisions on a conservation regime.
Elaboration on the BIOMASS Program may be found in the SCAR
Section of this study.

9th Consultative

Meetin~

Living resources became the priority issue on the Antarctic
2U. S. Department of State, Final EIS, p. 66.

J7
Treaty Consultative agenda in 1977.

At the 9th Antarctic

Treaty Consultative Meeting (London), it was decided that
a definitive conservation regime should be established by
the end of 1978.

(See:

Annex III.)

The regime was to

be based on an ecosystem approach that would not be
limited only to commercially exploitable species and
would extend north of the Antarctic Treaty area (south of
60 0 South) where "necessary for the effective conservation
of species of the Antarctic ecosystem without prejudice to
coastal state jurisdiction in that area."

Article IV

principles of the Antarctic Treaty are to be guaranteed. J
Some nations felt that the IJ Party states should take into
their own hands the management responsibilities for
Antarctic marine living resources.
most others felt otherwise. 4
agreed upon.

The United States and

A few interim measures were

Parties were to:

1.

Cooperate in the exchange of data relating to
living marine resources.

2.

Demonstrate the greatest possible concern in
harvesting to avoid depletion of the stocks or
jeopardizing the Antarctic marin~_ ecosystem as
a whole.
-

J.

Urge states not party to the Treaty to respect the
guidelines if actively fishing.

3 IUCN, p. 11.

-4

Brewster, Robert C.: Deputy assistant Secretary of
State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Remarks in U. S. Congress, House, Committee
in Merchant Marine and Fisheries, ?isheries Miscellaneous.
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife
Conservation and the Environment on Antarctic Fisheries
Agreement, 95th Cong., 1st sessa (1977): p. 275.
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The issue of membership in the regime is left in an ambiguous
state in the Recommendations of the 9th Meeting.

Should

Recommendations IX-2(III)3a and IX-2(III)3b be interpreted
as advising against non-party involvement?

(See:

Annex III.)

Recommendation IX-2(III)J notes that "the Lne~7 regime should
explicitly recognize the prime responsibilities of the
Consultative Parties ...• "

In Recommendation IX-2(III)3b

they state that "the provisions of Article 4 of the Antarctic
Treaty shall not be affected by the regime."

Recommendation

IX-2 calls for a Special Consultative Meeting to negotiate
a draft regime.

Special Consultative Meeting - Canberra

From 27 February to 16 March, 1978, the first Special
Consultative Meeting was held in Canberra, Australia.
Eight negotiating texts were tabled by various delegations
at the beginning of the meeting.

Tentative concurrence

was reached on the question of membership since it was

---

agreed that the regime should take the form of an international
convention open to all states.

The Canberra Meeting formally

recognized the need for a conservation regime because of:
(1 )
(2 )

(J)
(4 )

the great living resource potential of the Antarctic;
the fact that commercial harvesting has already
begun;
realization of the consequences of an uncontrolled
harvest;
the perception of major gaps in scientific data. S

SBrewster, Remarks in U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee
on Commerce, Science and~ransporlation, P~tarctic Living
Marine Resources Ne otiations. Hearin before the National
Ocean Policy Study, 95th Cong., 2nd sess. 1978: p. 2, J.
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Two issues important to rational management were not
discussed.

Interim conservation standards or measures and

the provisional application of the new convention escaped
i d era t'~on. 6

cons~

The claimant states may be attempting to

enha~ce

Antarctic claims through the resource regime.

their

Their argu-

ment was based on the fact that the Antarctic Treaty itself
does not deal with the resource issue; therefore, a failure
of the new regime to preserve their right to control fishery
zones would be equivalent to denial of the existence of
the territorial claims. 7 Unfortunately, such reactions show
a tendency toward weighing political considerations more
heavily than environmental considerations.

A regime based

on political interests will be mucn less likely to be an
effective conservation instrument as it will be a statement
of international political-commercial matters.

The Canberra draft opens the convention to all states engaged
in research or harvesting within the convention area. 8 Some
of the Antarctic Treaty Group had argued for special rights
for Treaty members, but this was not included in the draft.
The production of a basis for further negotiation, though,
was an important step forward.

The major accomplishment

6Barnes, Memo - Special Consultative Meeting, Canberra,
p. 8.

7I bi d., P. 17.
8South Korea and Taiwan may be prevented from entering
because of political problems. Both are presently willing
to participate. Ibid., p. 18.
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of the Canberra meeting was the preparation of a single

unified negotiating text. 9

Special Consultative Meeting - Buenos Aires

The last Special Consultative Meeting of the Antarctic
Treaty Powers was held in Buenos Aires, Argentina from
17 to 28 JUly, 1978.

The most critical issues at this

meeting related to territorial claims, voting requirements
and the basic ecosystem standard.

Discussion of interim

conservation measures was blocked by one of the delegations, and once again no agreement was reached on the
claims issue.

Though such procedural problems were

encountered, it is rumored that the Buenos Aires text is
stronger in several aspects from a conservation viewpoint
than was the Canberra draft. l O

As far as the juridical question is concerned, the Canberra
and Buenos Aires drafts were essentially identical and
unacceptable to several claimant and non~claimant states.
The language of the draft apparently left the juridical
question in a condition of much flexibility.

Several

solutions were advanced and found unwelcome.

Confusion seemed

to be the only outsome, so the United States offered to
9 I b i d . , p. 18.

lOBarnes, Jim, Memorandum concerning - Special
Consultative Meeting of the Antarctic Treaty Fowers,
Buenos Aires, Argentina (17-28 July 1978) and Informal
Meeting in Washington D. C. (18-26 September 1978) to
Negotiate a Marine Living Resources Regime, for Center For
law and Social Policy (20 November 1978): p. 3, 9.
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ll
host an informal working group in washington.

Informal Meeting

The Washington meeting was opened on 18 September. 1978 for
the explicit purpose of continuing work on the juridical
and decision-making articles.

The outcome of this meeting

was an attempt to protect both claimant and non-claimant
positions.

It is reported that Parties on either side

of the issue may interpret the provisions as supporting
their beliefs.

It is believed this approach will work if

the claimants restrain from trying to enforce or exercise
the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone rights of a coastal state. 12 This is a tenuous stability
and may not provide for a successful conservation regime.

The claims issue is especially important in light of the
fact that the Buenos Aires has allowed for membership in
the regime to be open to any state participating in the
meeting which finally produces an acceptable text.

Whether

or not they engage in harvesting or scientific research
in the Antarctic is not the crucial factor, unless they are
absent from this decisive meeting.

If absent, they may accede

to the Treaty if engaged in research of harvesting of
Antarctic marine living resources.
llIbid., p. 15.
l2 I bi d., p. 17.

These are the only
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standards presently provided to evaluate a potential member. l J

Some states have favored the creation of an exclusive
Antarctic conservation club limited in membership to nations
presently involved.

The legal right of the Antarctic

Treaty Parties to monopolize discussion of the resource
issue is questionable.

First, no duties or obligations

arising from the Treaty Consultations can be imposed on
non-treaty states.

Second, the Treaty does not confer

any ownership to the Antarctic.

It may be beyond the legal

limits of the Treaty parties to exclude the international
community from resource benefit.

~hird,

the Treaty is

especially weak concerning the areas where the important
resources are to be found--the Southern Ocean and the
Continental Shelf.

It could also be argued that there is

no precedent for ascribing jurisdiction in waters surrounding

°
14
an area V01°d 0 f any na to10na1 sovere1gnty.

Since 1973, the Treaty

~owers

have discussed living and

mineral resources in secret sessions.

-"

Reports and deliber-

ations of Consultative meetings have always been held in
secret because the original signatories to the Treaty chose
not to establish an open organization. 1 5

The present air

of secrecy may be partially due to concern over Third World
interference in the negotiations.

There is a safeguard

13 I b i d., p. 2J.

14 IUCN, p. 12.
15Barnes, James N., Statement in U. S. Congress, Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science and~ransportation, Antarctic
livin Marine Resources Ne otiations. Hearin before the
National Ocean Policy Study, 95th Cong., 2nd sess. 1978: p. JO.
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against policy-making by a single state in the fact that all
recommendations must be unanimous. 16 The Treaty Parties,
though, have affirmed the interest of the world community
in the protection of Antarctic resources.

(See:

Annex III. )

Since 1959 they have enacted a variety of protective
measures for the environment and encouraged non-treaty state
participation in enforcement.

In spite of this apparent

concern, no consultative party has proposed inviting other
organizations or states to attend the meetings. l? Only
two categories of states may share in the policy-making-the original 12 and any subsequent interested states willing
to accede to the Treaty.

For a nation to gain Consultative

status, interest must be proved by "conducting substantial
scientific research activity."

(See:

Article IX (2).)

The

Article IX provision of the Antarctic Treaty fails to define
"substantial."

This has led to an incongruent mix of

states within and without the decision-making arena.

The

status of any of the original 12 cannot be changed unless
they are willing to withdraw.

An acceding state, though,

may loose status if its interest falls short.

Several

original party states show little scientific invol~ent;18
while several states with scientific interest do not have
Consultative status. 19 Therefore, the Antarctic Treaty is
l60 f course, there is the possibility of a single Consultative state veto and, therefore, blockage of policy by that lone state.
l?Anonymous, p. 842.
18Belgium has no station. Norway has two seasonal
stattons with no more than 14 persons on site. _ South Africa,
New(~ealand and France have only one station a piece.
\-

~

19Italy, Denmark, Switzerland and West Germany.
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breaking down in its attempt to represent this southernmost
continent with interested nations.

It is suggested that

this may be because the Treaty mechanism was established
before the commercial and environmental concerns were on
.
20 An interesting question is whether it
th e upsw~ng.
would be acceptable for a group of less developed countries
to join together and collectively commit resources to
Antarctic research, thereby entitling them to Consultative
status.

The experience of the Group of 77 on the LOS

negotiations indicates that this may
and economical alternative.

be a feasible political

If the Antarctic Treaty effec-

tively survives, the Antarctic issue remains separate
from the UNCLOS negotiations, and the Third World states
are essentially unrepresented in the upcoming living
resource management regime, such a pact may be of worth in
order to assert Third World interests.

The response of the Treaty powers to most outside initiatives has been negative.

Though they have not established

any sort of sovereignty (joint or otherwlse) in Antarctic,
they demonstrate a dominion position.
for this are suggested.

Two possible reasons

First, to protect the balance struck

between claimants and non-claimants, and secondly, out of
resistance to share the benefits of eventual resource
exp1 o~' t a t'~on. 21
20 Anonymous, p. 835.
21 IUCN, p. 14.
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The Antarctic Treaty Group was partially responsible for the
withdrawal of a proposed $45 million FAO/UNDP program and
have blocked considerations by UNEP concerning the Treaty
area. 22 The proposed UNEP program sought to give special
attention to protection of the environment, especially to
the possibility of exploitation of resources.

The plan

was to have the Treaty Powers and "other concerned governments" establish a body to formultte guidelines for exploration and exploitation.

Members of the ATG in attendance

at UNEP's Governing Council blocked any consideration of
this matter. 23

The 1959 Antarctic Treaty appears to affirm the interest of
all states.

Questionable is the appropriateness of its

structure for the protection of living marine resources
and implementation of the rights of non-party states.

The

extent to which the Treaty applies off shore is debatable.
Should the legal status of the continent apply to the seas
south of 60 0 South latitude?

Article VI delimits the
-

Treaty area as south of 60 0 South but high seas within
this area are excluded.

As of yet, agreement on the status

of the waters within the Treaty area has not been reached.

The Antarctic Treaty System has been instrumental in

outlinin~

resource management stipulations for terrestrial organisms
22 I bi d., p. 14j Wilson, Gregory, P. "Antarctica, The Southern Ocean and the Law of the Sea." (Thesis prepared for Professor
louis B. Sohn, Harvard Law School 1976): p. 24.
23Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, Japan, USSR, UK. and the
US are members of the Governing Council. Belgium and Norway are
not members but were represented. Wilson, G., p. 25.
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(Agreed Mea su r es ) and in initiating research activity for the
purpose of better understanding the Antarctic Ecosystem (BIOMASS).
The incipient stage of agreement on a conservation regime
for Antarctic marine living resources was the 9th Concultative Meeting (1977).

There was concensus among the

parties that the "ecosystem approach" be utilized and that
the new regime should cover the area of competence of the
Antarctic Treaty and extend north of 60 0 South latitude
where necessary for effective conservation.

The 1959

Antarctic Treaty though, does not represent the Antarctic
with all interested states.

If krill exploitation grows

without a settlement, it may pose no great problem if
limited to the Antarctic Treaty Parties.

The Treaty at

least provides for exchange of scientific information,
environmental controls, and a weak form of dispute settlement.

However, states not bound by the Treaty have already

expressed an interest in the krill resource.

Wi t hout a

separate internationalcgreement, these states may possibly
become environmentally and politically disruptive.

Inter-

national activity within the Antarctic region involving ATG and
non-ATG states is becoming more common.

Chapter V
International Practice
Fishing
As noted, expeditions devoted mainly to development in the
field of fisheries (as opposed to whaling, sealing or science)
have begun relatively recently.
has greatly accelerated.

Interest in the krill fishery

In addition to the potential of

krill as a protein source, the establishment of 200-mile
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) has forced distant-water
fishing nations to find new marine fisheries. 1 Fishing industries such as fish-meal and oil are only feasible when
catch rates are very high; therefore, the lowered catch rates
in traditional fishing areas is an additional stimulus.
These developments taken together with improvements in krill
harvest methods and the decline of Southern Hemisphere
whaling, combine to motivate fishing states to begin exploitation of this Antarctic crustacean.

The Soviets were among the first to fish krill, catching
1 For example, it is estimated that the USSR may be deprived of six million tons of fish when 200-mile EEZ's come
into force world wide. Earthscan Press Briefing Document No.
5, "The Future of Antarctica,"
The United Kingdom Confederation of Fried Fish Caterers
Associations is pressing the government to lay claim to vast
areas of the South Atlantic by drawing 200-mile zones around
a number of 'British' islands. Barbara Mitchell, "Antarctic
Riches - For Whom?," Forum (August 1976), both in U.S.
Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Exploitation of Antarctic Resources. Hearing before the Subcommittee
on Arms Control, Oceans and International Environment, 95th
Cong., 2nd sess., (1978): pp. 76,218.
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four tons with the vessel MUKSUN in 1961-62.

They have

operated in the Southern Ocean in most years since, rep ortedly taking tens of tons of krill per year and began harvesting commercially in 1967. 2 Since 1969, Soviet commercial
fleets have fished throughout the Southern Ocean.) The
Japanese have also put much effort into the krill fishery.
In 1972-7), the vessel CHIYODA MARU caught 59 tons of krill.
During the 197)-74 season, the Japanese catch rose to 646
tons and in the 1974-75 season, to about 2,600 tons. 4
Apparently the market in Japan is being successfully developed
utilizing the products mentioned earlier in this study.
Chile in 1974-75 reported a catch of 64 tons.

The Federal

Republic of Germany and Poland began systematic exploration
of the southwest Atlantic and extreme southeast Pacific areas,
apparently achieving rates of catch high enough to

~uggest

economical system of harvesting (assuming a market can be
developed).

The season of 1976-77 produced a great intensification and
expansion of the fishing effort.

During this season, the

Japanese engaged five or six vessels.

)Earthscan, p. 210.
4Eddie, p. 5.

Poland supported a

an
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fisheries research vessel and at least four commercial trawlers.

The German Democratic Republic and Taiwan also sent

fishermen to the area.

Taiwan reported 130 tons of krill

caught within eighteen days.

The Chileans chartered a

Spanish stern trawler of 1,500 GRT and ),000 SHP.

The Nor-

wegians also carried out some scientific work regarding the
exploitation of krill. 5

To summarize, Japan and the USSR are actively and routinely
engaged in harvesting and marketing and had invested about
$170 million each by 1975. 6 Japanese and Soviet products are
of high unit value and low tonnage potential (as in krill
pate).

Only recently have either of them seriously considered

a krill-meal of sorts.

Exploratory fishing and attempts at

product development have been taken up by the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Chile,
Poland, Taiwan, South Korea, France, and Norway.

These in-

clude trials in using krill for both animal feed and human
consumption.

There are no present or proposed krill fishing

operations by the United States.

During the early stages of development, effective methods of
capture had not been identified and some inneffective and

5 I bi d . , p. 6.
6Earthscan, p. 209.
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unorthodox types of fishing gear were used.? Catches were
limited by lack of satisfactory processing technology and by
lack of effective fishing methods.
has been solved.

The technological problem

A more tenacious barrier is the problem of

product and market development.

Also, estimates of the geo-

graphical distribution and concentration and overall magnitude of the resource must be more accurately validated.
Catch statistics given above were derived from very limited
data, as countries are reluctant to share the knowledge.

Science
Scientific research forms the basis for the majority of
Antarctic international cooperation.

It may be considered

the forefront of national and international Antarctic policy
of interested states.

Basic scientific involvement, though,

stems form curiosity about the unique environment which is
almost entirely untouched by man.

Antarctic influence on

atmospheric circulation and ocean currents is tremendous.
Global climatic change may be easily

mon~~ored.

Past cli-

matic conditions have left a record in the ice cap dating
back tens of thousands of years.

Geologists are uncovering

major support for the theory of continental drift.

Biologists

have to deal with as yet unknown species which have undergone
extraordinary evolutionary adaption.

Most research is

conducted during the less severe summer season (October
?There has been discussion of the possibility of harvesting krill through the introduction of harvestable predators
such as salmon. Ibid., p. 210.
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through March), but a small cadre of scientists do overwinter. 8
The Antarctic summer population is presently between five and
six thousand.

In 1976 there were thirty-four bases plus nine
on subantarctic islands. 9 International cooperation between
and among these scientific groups has become the accepted practice since it is both practical and mutually beneficial.

For

example, Argentina has provided transportation and logistic
support for United States biological teams and has allowed
the United States use of some of their facilities.

The United

States and four other nations man an Antarctic Weather Center
in Melbourne, Australia.

In 1975 a traverse was made across

the unknown Polar Plateau by an American team with a Belgian
and Norwegian.

Chilean scientists also participate in Amer-

ican activities and in the past have provided necessary emergency relief.

The United States and New Zealand provide each
other with logistic support. 10 There have also been United
States cooperative projects with Japan, South Africa and the
United Kingdom.

All of this activity has been undertaken within

8About 750 in 1976 - 34% Soviet, 15%-Argentinan, 11% U.S.,
9% Australian, 8% U.K. and the remainder from Chile, France, Japan, South Africa, and New Zealand. Ibid., p. 204.
9Eight for Argentina, 9 for the U.S.S.E., 5 for the U.K.,
4 for the U.S., 3 for Australia and Chile, 2 for South Africa,
and 1 each for Japan, New Zealand, and France. For the subantarctic islands: 3 for France, 2 each for South Africe and the
U.K., 1 each for Australia and New Zealand. Poland acceded
to the Treaty in 1961 and established a permanent station during the 1976/77 season. Netherlands is considering resuming research. Ibid., pp. 204,222.
10press release - Office of the
tary (May 1, 1965) in UIS. Congress,
eign Relations, US Antarctic Policy.
committee On Oceans and International
1st sess., (1075): p. 29.
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the framework of the Antarctic Treaty.

Science, though, is not the sole stimulus for the activity.
It is interesting and a little suspicious that even though
present activities are not to prejudice any stance on territorial claims. all scientific bases of claimant states lie
within their claimed sectors.

Such placement of bases may sig-

nify an attempt to satisfy the international law requirement
of effective occupation for establishment of claims.

Claims

Seven formal claims were made between 1908-46 by Argentina,
Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the United
Kingdom leaving about 15% of the continent unclaim~d.11

The

United States has rejected all existing claims, but along with
the Soviet Union, reserves its historic rights to a portion of
the Antarctic. 12 Argentina and Chile are most adamant about
maintaining their stance on the claims issue.
-

Australia, with

the biggest claim, takes a hard line and is increasingly alining itself with Chile and Argentina. 13New Zealand and Norway
seem to take the most flexible positions.
11Brazil, which acceded to the Antarctic Treaty in 1975,
has apparently made a recent territorial assertion overlapping
Argentina's claim. This is impossible, though, under the Treaty
to which Brazil is now bound. Earthscan, p. 222.
12
""
.
"
Barnes, James, Remarks In U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee
on Commerce, Science and Transportation, Antarctic Living Marine
Resource Ne" otiations. . Hearin before the National Ocean Folic
Study, 95th Cong., 2nd sess.. 1978 :p. 37.
13Earthscan, p. 221.
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Outside Initiatives

The Group of 77 with their demand for a New International Economic order are pres .suring the Consultative Powers for a say in
the regime and some benefit from the krill harvest.

Guinea,

in a strong 1976 speech at FAO on the less-developed country
(LDC) need for protein, asked for equal control over the FAO/
UNDP Antarctic Program by 'developed' and 'less-developed'
countries. 14 LDC interests will need to be considered in
any equitable and successful krill management regime.

The European Economic Community (EEC) has become a problem by
taking the position that it is entitled (through member countries: Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom) to become a
full negotiating party and participate in the

~ecisive'

meet-

ing on a conservation regime for Antarctic marine living resources.

The U.S.S.R. and Poland are opposed to acceptance of

the EEC.

The United States and some others would not mind as

long as the EEC did not have a vote on

m~~ters

outside its compe-

tence or take the position that individual EEC countries cannot speak for themselves under the convention. 1S

Several nations are becoming more interested and active in the

14Earthscan, p. 222.
15I t is though that this may arise from a dispute within
the EEC over who has final word on certain decisions. French
and British possessions and claims in the Southern Ocean have
been exempted from the EEC Common ~isheries Policy. Barnes,
Special Consultative Meeting, Buenos Aires.
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practice of krill fishing.

Scientific research is being car-

ried out independently and cooperatively by several nations.
St a t es not included within the Antarctic Treaty "Club" are
beginning to assert their interest in benefit from Antarctic
resource exploitation.

The New International Economic Order

is calling for representation by LDC's
concern the international community.

in decisions which
Krill management deci-

sions are of concern to the international community. The Consultative

~arties,

though, all want to maintain the Treaty and

are concerned with outside initiatives.

Actions by FAOjUNDP

and UNEP have brought negative reactions from the Treaty Powers.
Several international agreements, however, have implications
for the Antarctic which may influence the administration of
the present Antarctic "Club" with regard to marine living resources.

Chapter VI
The 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea

What effects do the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the
Sea have upon marine resource acquisition within the area south
of 60 0 South latitude?
pretation.

The answers follow the whim of inter-

Before delving into this section, it should be not-

ed that not all of the Antarctic Treaty Powers are party to
all of the 1958 Law of the Sea Conventions.

Of the Consulta-

tive Parties, only the United States, United Kingdom, South
Africa and Australia have ratified all four of these conventions.
Denmark is the only acceding state with ratification of the
four conventions.
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone 1

Consultative States party to this convention (in force 10 September 1964)

includ~:

Australia, Belgium, Japan, South Africa,

the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and the United States.

The

Antarctic Treaty Parties which have not ratified this convention
are all claimant states (Argentina, Chile, France, New Zealand
and Norway) except for the newest arrival (Poland).

Brazil is

the only acceding state of the Antarctic Treaty Group which
has failed to ratify this convention.

The problem with application of this convention is one of interpretation of the issue of sovereignty over the Antarctic
l U . S • Department of State, "1958 Convention on the Te'l:"ritorial Sea and.Contiguous Zone,""U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements, TIAS 5639.
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Continent.

A claim to a Territorial Sea or Contiguous Zone

must be based on a nations sovereignty over the adjacent land
Article 1 of this 1958 Geneva Convention says:

mass.

1. The sovereignty of a State extends, beyond its land
territory and its internal waters, to a belt of sea ad_.jacent to its coast, described as the territorial sea.
2. This sovereignty is exercised sUbject to the provisions of these articles and to other rules of international law.
Consider Article 2:
The sovereignty of a coastal State extends to the air
space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed
and subsoil.
Comparison of these first two articles reveals two noted weaknesses.

The extent of the territorial sea is not designated

and the "coastal state" in Article 2 is not defined.

Because

of these undefined terms, maya special case be made for the
Antarctic where "Consultative State" could be substituted for
"coastal s ta't a'", thereby, allowing the Treaty Powers to establish a territorial sea to cover the entire treaty area?
possible for a condominium (one of the selected
since joint sovereignty is exercised, to

ial sea?

Is it

options,p.~)

~~tablish

a territor-

The questions are left in an ambiguous condition by

this Geneva Convention.
Convention on the High Seas 2

Consultative States party to this convention include Australia,
Belgium, Japan, Poland, South Africa, Soviet Union, United King2U• S. Department of State, "1958 Convention on the High
Seas,ll u.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements, TIAS
5200.

dom and the United States.
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Argentina, Chile, France, New Zealand

and Norwa y are not party.

Of the six acceding states, Brazil and

the Ne t h er l a nd s are not party.

If final concensus holds that

high seas around the Antarctic continent begin at the low water
mark, as argued by the United States, provisions of the 1958
Convention on the High Seas (in force JO September 1962) will be
applicable.

"High seas' are defined as all seas not included in the territorial
sea or internal waters of a State (Article 1 of High Seas Convention).

Therefore, if it is illegal to establish a territorial sea

around the Antarctic then the waters are by definition "high seas·.
According to Article 2 of the High Seas Convention:
The high seas being open to all nations, no State may
validly purport to sUbject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under th e
conditions laid down by these articles and by the other
rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both
for coastal and non-coastal States:
1) Freedom of navigation;
2) Freedom of fishing;
J) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the
general principles of international ~aw, shall be exercised . by all States with reasonable regard to the interests
of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the
high seas.
It should be noted that these four freedoms may not be exclusive.
The Antarctic marine environment may thus be vulnerable to the
high seas freedoms of the world community.

Without some sort

of specific management provisions, environmental protection of
the area will be impossible.
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Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources
of the High seas 3

Once again, applicability will depend upon the nature of the
waters surrounding the Antarctic.

States party to this Con-

vention (in force 10 March 1966) which are also party to the
Antarctic Treaty include Australia, Belgium, France, South
Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Argentina

Chile, Japan, New Zealand, Norway and Poland are not party.
Of the six acceding nations of the Antarctic Treaty Group,
only Denmark and the Netherlands are signatories.

The essential aspects of this Convention are contained in
Article 1:
1. All States have the right for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas, subject (a) to their
treaty obligations, (b) to the interests and rights of
coastal States as provided fo~ in this Convention, and
(c) to the provisions contained in the following articles
concerning conservation of the living resources of the
high seas.
2. All States have the duty to adop~~ or to cooperate
with other States in adopting, such measures for their
respective nationals as may be necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas.
'Conservation' is defined in Article 2 in terms of rendering
possible the optimum sustainable yield.

Article 3 requires

States to adopt all necessary conservation measures.

Inter-

national agreement on conservation measures is called for by
Article 4 in the case of two or more nations fishing the same

3U• S. Department of State, "1958 Convention on Fishing
and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas," U.S.
Treaties and Other International Agreements, TIAS 5969.

59
stock.

If negotiations fail, the coastal state may adopt

unilateral high seas conservation measures under Article

6.
The Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas stresses that krill fishing nations
enter into some sort of conservation agreement.

The Convention,

though, is not declaratory and has been relatively weak. Determination of when conservation measures are "necessary" as
provided in Article 3 will differ with each of the krill fishing nations.

It should also be noted that the most active

Antarctic fishing nations, Japan and the Sov1et Union, have
not ratified the Convention. 4
Convention on the Continental Shelf 5

Consultative Powers party to the Convention on the Continental
Shelf (in force 10 June 1964) are Australia, France, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the Soviet Union,
United Kingdom,
-- -and the United States.

Argentina, Belgium, Chile, Japan,

and Poland are not party to this Convention.

Of the Antarctic

Treaty Group acceding states, only Brazil is not party.

4Non-ratification by the U.S.S.R. is primarily due to the
unwillingness of the Soviets to accept any system of compulsory
arbitration as provided by Articles 9, 10 and 11. Koers, Albert,
International Re lation of Marine Fisheries (Fishing News
Books Ltd., Surrey, England, 1973 : p. 118.
Su.S. Department of State, "1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf,
U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements, TIAS 5578.
It
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The Continental Shelf articles refer to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast and are.
therefore. not applicable to a krill management regime.

Off-

shore mineral resources will fall under the legalities of this
Convention.

The 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea fail to
provide concrete guidance for krill management.

States are

reluctant to give up any prerogatives in favor of international
law and will. therefore. interpret these Conventions to their
benefit.

Freedom of fishing and conservation do not go hand-

in-hand.

The problem is one of finding a balance between the

fishing and non-fishing nations regarding conservation.

Both

the lack of accepted procedure for defining the objectives
of international law and the lack of communication _among nations augments the challenge of specifying krill management
measures.

The context of international marine

fish~!jes

treaty law is

dynamic in nature and sUbject to continuous change. 6
United Nations

The third

Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III)

may assist in clearing some of the ambiguities found in the
1958 Conventions.

The Informal Composite Negotiating Text

(ICNT) is the latest working document borne by delegations to
the present Iaw of the Sea Conference.

The ICNT is absent of

any reference to the Southern Ocean or the Antarctic Treaty
6:Koers. p. 38.
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Area, but as with the 1958 Geneva Conventions has implications which will be considered in the next chapter.

Chapter VIr
Potential Impact of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text

Sovereignty over the land mass and the surrounding waters is
central to the question of the extent of influence exerted by
the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT).l

The Antarc-

tic Treaty provides no special rights for the Antarctic Treaty
Group (ATG) with respect to high seas.

Depending on the in-

terpretation of the status of the waters within 200 miles of
the Antarctic land mass, the international community may have
purview over the entire Southern Ocean.

ICNT provisions appli-

cable to the High Seas will then have to be weighed in the
management of these waters.

If it is assumed that territorial

seas and EEZ's may be implemented, the sovereign state(s) will,
of course, have much more control.

However, certain provisions

of the rCNT will still merit attention.

High Seas
High Seas within the Treaty area will be sUbject to Part VII 2
of the rCNT.

The essence of this part with regard to krill

is asserted in Article 87:
Freedom of the high seas comprises, inter alia, ... Freedom of fishing.
Unprotected by either the Antarctic Treaty or the rCNT or the
1958 Geneva Conventions, the krill resource may become victim
of the 'commons' tragedy.

If the fishing grounds are designat-

ed as High Seas, a separate international managemont scheme
lInformal Composite Negotiating Text, U.N. Dec. A/Conf. t
62/WP. 10 (1977) is the outcome of the Sixth Session of UNClOS.
(Hereafter cited as lCNT)
2 I CNT, Part VII - High Seas.
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will be needed in order to protect this resource.

This is

especially true in light of Article 89:
No state may validly purport to subject any part of the
high seas to its sovereignty.

This article is mentioned not to advocate individual
agement by many states,

man-

but because of its added influence

in keeping the fishing areas open to the international communi ty.

Exclusive Economic Zone

Assuming the claimant states and/or the ATG are able to establish an EEZ, the international community may still have a right
to influence decisions.

An EEZ is limited by Article 57 to

not more than 200 nautical miles.)

The United States is of
-

the opinion that the waters within the EEZ should be considered high seas. 4 Article 56 gives the coastal state "sovereign
rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving
and managing the natural resources."

"Sovereign rights" are

not the same and do not imply the same powers as "sovereignty".
Article 61 grants the coastal state the power to determine the
allowable catch, but also mentions that "special requirements
of developing countries" must be considered.

Though not at-

tempting to minimize the power of the Coastal State, the notion
that the international community will still have reason to de'rCNT, Part V - Exclusive Economic Zone .
4Control of "creeping jurisdiction" is the apparent reason for this stance.
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mand access to krill resources is noteworthy.

This point

is important because it reinforces the need for a definitive marine resource management regime.
specifically a zone of sovereignty.

The EEZ is not

The lack of definition

of limitations on "sovereign rights" and on the "special re-

-

quirement of developing countries" leaves much open for debate.

The position of the Consultative Powers is somewhat

strengthened by the recognition of historical rights in
Article 62. 5

However, the righ~ of land-locked (LL) states

under Article 69 to "participate in the exploitation of the
living resources of the EEZ's of adjoining states" may lead
to a mass of claims.

Afghanistan, Austria, Bolivia, Botswana,

Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Lesotho, Mongolia, Paraguay,
Southern Rhodesia, Swaziland, and Switzerland are all LL states
which border a member of the ATG.

Unless a

s~para~e

legal re-

gime is set up for the Antarctic so that the resources within
200 miles of the coast are managed by a specific group of
states, independent nations may claim overlapping EEZ's. Since
the distinctive Antarctic marine resources are so far removed
geographically from the rest of the world, nations without the
technology to exploit these resources may claim 'geographic
disadvantage' under Article 70.

The potential situation is one

which may leave control over the Antarctic living marine resources in a state of flux with no discernable rational scheme
for management.

5I t should be noted that "historical" rights may not be)
as yet, established. The quality of the rights under this Article is questionable.
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Management and Conservation

Management and Conservation of the Living Resources of the
High Seas is discussed under Part VII of the ICNT.

6

An in-

ternational treaty to affect a rational approach to krill
management is recognized by Article 116:
All states have the right for their nationals to engage
in fishing on the High Seas subject to (a) Their treaty
obligations.
The caveat is that if there is no treaty obligation then no
stipulations could be placed on the harvest.

How may states

be coerced into ad9pting conservation measures?

A state's

duties to adopt conservation measures and cooperate with other
states in management are asserted in Articles 117 and 118.
Clearly a mere duty is not enough to convince a nation that
it must make a sacrifice.

States must be convinced that it

is in their national interests to consider the possibility
of limiting and sharing the catch.

Shares in the resource

will circumvent much political turmoil which would be catalyzed by the omission of interested states from the management regime.
icult.

Persuasion to limit the catch will be more diff-

Some nations believe krill to be so abundant that

there is no evident need for restraint.

Scientific data is,
as yet, inadequate to effectively refute this position. 7 The
argumen~of

"conservation first" is weak when advanced to na-

6 I CNT , Part VII, Section 2, "Management and conservation
of the living resources of the high seas."
7Th e trend in scientific opinion, though, is that krill
surplus is not as ab~ndant ~s o:igin~lly thought. Support for
conservation by Amer1can sC1ent1sts 1S strong.
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tionsin need of protein.

However, an "ecosystem approach"

to management strengthens the pro conservation and pro management positions.

Utilizations of the ecosystem standard

must designate the weakest link or the most vulnerable area
of impact as the prime consideration of management measures.
Nations may be more readily convinced of the need for a regime employing this approach.

Article 119 of the ICNT sup-

ports the "ecosystem approach".
In establishing their conservation measures for living
resources in the high seas, States shall take into account fishing patterns, (and) the interdependence of
stocks and any generally recommended subregional, regional or global minimum standards. (and) Take into
consideration the effects on species associated or
dependent upon harvested species with a view to maintaining or restoring populations of such associated or
dependent species above levels at which their reproduction may become seriously threatened.

Protection and Preservation

Part XII on the Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment furthers the "general obligations" of states to protect and preserve the marine environment. 8 - Global and regional cooperation concerning such conservation along with cooperation in research and data exchange is prompted by Articles
198 and 201.

Thus, even though these are "general" provisions,

a case may be made for the promotion of an international convention for Antarctic marine resource conservation.

A new management and conservation regime may find Article 238
8r c NT, Part XII - Protection and Preservation of the
Marine Environment.
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to be a useful provision for circumventing the marine environment protection requirements of the current negotiating text.
Article 2)8 (1) - The prov1s10ns of this Part of the
Convention shall be without prejudice to the specific
obligations assumed by States under special conventions
and agreements concluded previously which relate to the
protection and preservation of the marine environment.
Thereby, a convention which enters into force prior to stipulations of the rCNT will have priority.

However, Article

238 (2) maintains that "Specific obligations assumed by States
under special conventions ..• should be applied in a manner
consistent with the general principles and objectives of the
present convention."

This sounds like more of a recommend-

ation than an obligation as evidenced by use of the word
"should" instead of "shall".

A krill management regime will

find little hinderance from this article which provides a
method to bypass many of the general orders of the rCNT.

The ICNT, if it is an adequate prediction of the final UNCLOS
III Conventions, is proof in itself that

_~h e

Antarctic area

should be kept separate from the UNCLOS arena.

The general-

ity of the standards pursued will not be conducive to rational management of the Southern Ocean.

If only High Seas are

found in the area, one set of consequences will result.

On

the other hand, if territorial seas and EEZ's are allowed,
a different set of results will be seen.

In either case, the

possible rush of states to exploit the krill resources will
create as many problems.

The unique natural and political

setting of the Antarctic calls for a unique and integrated
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approach to conservation of the marine living resources.
Unless the Antarctic Treaty Group or some larger group of
states produces an acceptable solution to allocation and management of krill resources, there is little chance the resource will be cooperatively utilized.

As will be discussed

in the following chapter, the administrative skill and machinery for such cooperative and rational management of the
krill resource is already partially in existance.

Chapter VIII
Selac~

International Organizations Affecting the Antarctic

Several international organizations have interests in Antarctic marine living resources.

The most significant for

the purposes of this study are the International Whaling
Commission, the Food and Agricultural Organization, and
the Scientific Committee of Antarctic Research.

These three

have been most noticably active with respect to Antarctic
maring living resources and may play important roles within
a new resource management regime.

International Whaling Commission
Prior to World War II, several species of whales needed protection but international agreement could not be reached.
World War II supplied the needed suspension of operations
to give Antarctic whaling nations time to work out arrangements.
In 1944, a seasonal limit of 16,000 blue-whale-units south of
40 0 South latitude was set. 1 This catch limit became part of
the International Convention for Regulation of Whaling
(signed in Washington on 2 December 1946, in force on 10
November 1948) which established the International Whaling
Commission (IWC).2 Members of the Commission are: Argentina,
10n e blue-whale-unit equals 1 blue whale, 2 fin whales,
2t humpback whales, or 6 sei whales. Koers, p. 87. J Seasonal
catches before WWII had run about 24,000 blue-whale-units.
Gambell, Ray, "Whale Conservation: Role of the International
Whaling Commission," Marine Policy (October 1977):p. 304.
2Koers, p. 88.
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Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Japan, Mexico,

Norway ,Panama , South Africa, United Kingdom, United States,
and the Soviet Union.

The major responsibilities of the IWC have been to propose
amendments to the Convention and promote scientific investigations by member states in order to review the status of the
whale stocks.

Changes in the whaling schedule are to be based

on scientific findings and the interests of the consumers of
whale products and the whaling industry.

Prevention of over-

fishing has been the inherent problem of the organization
because of differing national interests.

Economic incentives

provided the foremost obstacle to agreement.

Nations, under-

standably, wanted to recover their investments and see a profit.

Tension between conservation proponents and industrial,

economic interests, along with a members option to dissent
from a majority decision of the Commission (if an objection
was entered within 90 days), augumented difficulties of the
IWC.

Blanket quotas were set for the stocks as a whole.

There was no system of national

allocation~

Competition to

obtain the largest share of the quota led to an increase in
the number of ships entering the whaling industry.J In the
early 1960's, Norway and the Netherlands temporarily withdrew from the IWC causing the Commission to suspend its
quota limitations in order to prevent its collapse.
J Gambell, p. J04.

This
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basic controversy generated the relative failure of the IWC.
The excessively high catch limit of 16,000 blue-whale-units
was not adequately reduced for nearly twenty years.

Improve-

ments in scientific knowledge and the pressure of public opinion were needed before whaling nations
in the quotas.

~o u l d

accept reductions

Since 1965, the IWC has apparently had some w

success in limiting whale harvest to scientifically acceptable
levels.

Another serious weakness was that regulation was

based opon artificial blue-whale-units, rather than on assessments of individual stocks.

In 1972, the blue-whale-unit

was eliminated and quotas were set on an individual species
basis. 4 It should be noted that in spite of its drawbacks,
the IWC may have actually saved some whale species from
extinction by providing a channel for public opinion.

Some have claimed that the IWC is insufficient for presentday management.

They question the accuracy of the scientific

basis used in decision making.

However, an International

Decade of Cetacean Research has been launched by IWC in response to proposals from UNEP and others.

A new management

policy has also been adopted which requires much expansion
in research.

The aim is to reduce uncertainties in whale

stock assessment and resolve problems arising from interactions between different Antarctic species. 5 In other words,
4I b i d., p. 305.
5Biological Investigations of Marine Antarctic Systems
and Stocks (BIOMASS), Vol. I: Research Proposals (August 1977):
E~ H-63. in U.S. Department or'State, Final EIS, Appendix H.
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the HvC is beginning to employ the "ecosystem approach."

Whale stocks are now classified into three categories.
"Protection stocks" consist of whales which are completely
protected.

Included within this category are Blue, Humpback

Gray, Right, Bowhead and some Fin whales.

"Sustained manage-

ment stocks" are those whose catch is permttted in carefully
controlled quotas.

Included here are some Sperm, Fin, Sei

and Minke whales.

In "Initial management stocks" whaling is

permitted in accordance with somewhat higher quotas.

These

include Bryde's, some Minke and some Sperm whales. 6

Six IWC whaling regions have been delimited. (See: Figure V)

-

It may be to the advantage of the Antarctic living resource
management regime to utilize this same system.

Potential
-

for impact on the whale stocks is increased by the fact that
krill fishing may be concentrated in the same open-ocean
areas and at the same time of year (October-March) as
are feeding.

whal~s

Studies have indicated that present krill

fishing levels in IWC Arre II (Southwest Atlantic portion of
the Southern Ocean) are approximately 1% of the total consumed by whales in that area.

Therefore, substantial impacts

on whales may be seen if the krill harvest is increased by
only a few million tons and concentrated in specific areas.
Another factor to be considered is the possible affect on
krill swarming behavior by a krill fishery.

6 Gambell, p. 308.

A marked change
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Source: Bengtson, John T., "Review of Information Regarding the
Co ns e r va t i on of living Resources of The Antarctic ~ a r i n e
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Study, 95th Co r z , 2nd s e s s , (1978) :116
J

74
in the swarming phenomenen could also have a detrimental
result for the whale stocks. 7 Along with coincidence of
management regions, the 'catch year' for krill and whales
should concur.

Reporting and compilation of data in this
way would improve management decisions. 8

Considerations of krill exploitation must necessarily take
account of affect on whales; therefore, a system of close
coordination should be set up with the IWC. Overlap in jurisdiction should be carefully avoided or provided for by some
sort of joint action measures.

The International Union for

Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) has
suggested that discrepancies between the two conventions may
occur because of:
1) Differences in positions of various states because
of the complexity of the science involved in decision
making,
2) Differences in decision procedures in the two
conventions,
3) Differences9~n states' members acceding to the two
conventions.
The discrepancies could lead to differences in priority
given to the recovery of a specific specie"s of whale.
latory provisions for special areas may differ.

Regu-

For example,

the IWC may consider an area to be in need of special

7AS an interim measure it is suggested by Barnes that
the allowable krill catch in each statistical area be no more
than 2% of the estimated krill consumption by whales in the
same area. Barnes, J., "Memo - Special Consultative Meeting,
Buenos Aires, pp. 12,13.
8 Everson, p. 135.
9 IUCN, p. 39.
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protection in the form of a moratorium on fishing.

If the

krill fishing in the area is not also ceased, the recovery
by whales within this designated area will be negated.

It may be impossible to avoid conflicts, but fundamental
contradictions between the two conventions should be ironed
out.

A close working relationship, with mandatory dispute

settlement procedures, between the IWC and the proposed
Antarctic Living Resource Conservation Regime is needed.
Krill and Whales will be harvested from the same general areas.
Non-settlement of discrepencies in this case is not tolerable
in an "ecosystem approach" to management.

The Food and Agricultural Organization
The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United
Nations is directly involved with the resources of-the Southern
Ocean.

Its Antarctic interests are aimed toward better

utilization and management rather than purely data compilation
or scientific research.

The two most important goals of the

FAO, as stated in the preamble of its constitution are to
raise levels of nutrition and standards of living.

It also

strives to improve the efficiency of production and distribution of food and agricultural products.

"Agricultural" is

i
f'1S h
'
'
· d as 1nc
. 1 u d 1ng
d e f 1ne
er1es
and
mar1ne
products. 10

10Article I in the Constitution.

Koers, p. 104.
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COFI and ACMRR
The FAa Committee on Fisheries (COFI) was created in 1966
and has proven to be a successful concept.

Even the Soviet

Union, which is not a member of FAa, sends observers to COFI
meetings.

Its success is partially due to the fact that it

is not a regulatory agency, but essentially a forum for
discussion of fishery problems.

Attempts are made by COFI

to realistically assess the effectiveness of international
arrangements.

FAa also has an Advisory Committee on Marine

Resources Research (ACMRR) which acts as an advisor to the
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Committee (laC) of the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) on fisheries aspects of oceanography.

It provides

a useful link begween the FAa and the scientific community.
The basic difference between ACMRR and COFT is that the former
is concerned with research and the latter with regUlatory and
policy matters. 11

Department of Fisheries
The FAa Department of Fisheries was

crea~ea

on 1 January 1966

for the purpose of promoting national and international action
with regard to the development and rational utilization of
marine living resources.

This department administers the

fishery development projects of the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP).
11 Koers, p. 107.
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At a 1974 FAO "Informal consultation on Antarctic krill", the
Department of Fisheries agreed to:
1) Produce a bibliography on krill,
2) Update accounts of knowledge, exploitation and
utilization of krill,
3) Act as an information center for research plans,
resource knowledge, fishing techniques, equipment
and utilization questions,
4) Review the need for international action suc~ as 12
expert group meetings and joint research proJects.

COFI has decided that FAO should have no role in implementation
of management measures.

This type of activity should be

purely regional, involving treaty-based commissions.

There

has been quite a bit of disagreement on FAO's role in the
formation of conservation regulations. 130bviously, the formulation of general guidelines for conservation is useless in
light of the diversity of regional conditions.

However, one

of the basic knowledge requirements for management of the
Southern Ocean is insight into the amounts of
resources taken each year.

living

The FAO Southern Oceans Fisheries

Program (funded by UNDP) was started in July of 1975.

This

--

program intends to compile and disseminate information on
the distribution, magnitude and present state of exploitation
and utilization of Southern Ocean living resources. 14
12BIOMASS, p. H-63.
13Miles, Edward 1., "Changes in the Law of the Sea: Impact
on International Fishery Organizations," Ocean Development and
International Law 4 (1977):p. 438.
14 IUCN, p. 14.
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Froblems exist with respect to the Consultative Farties
willingness to accept initiative from a global

organizatio~.

Fast hostility by the Antarctic Treaty Powers to outside
initiative has been noted elsewhere in this study.

Another

area of concern may be FAD's ability (or inability) to fulfill
a major responsibility in the Antarctic.

Some may say that

FAD resources are insufficient for their present operations.
They argue that the organization:
1) Has a lack of qualified manpower,
2) Is imbalanced in the area of operations between
production and utilization,
3) Dveremphasises resources surveys without adequate
15
emphasis on catch processing and marketing techniques.
These arguments are not conclusive nor entirely applicable to
the situation around the Antarctic.

Consultative Parties are

unlikely to allow accession to the new regime by any state
with a mere expression of interest.

The FAD will then pro-

vide liaison between the krill management body and the nonmember nations.

Regular consultation, joint scientific

meetings and notification on major management decisions will
facilitate coordination between the two international bodies
to their mutual benefit.

The FAD has considerable membership of less-developed-countries.
The management regime devised for the Antarctic will be of
significant interest to these courtries.

Many less-developed-

countries, for one reason or another, may be omitted from the
15Miles, p. 434.
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decision-making body of the new regime.

For these developing

countries, the FAO could provide a useful forum for expression
of views and exchange of information concerning krill
resources.

Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research

The Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR)
was organized in 1958 by the International Council of
Scientific Unions (ICSU) at the request of the 1957
IGY Antarctic Conference.

Its area of interest is

south of the Antarctic Convergence with a few small
island

areas to the north.

The initial members of

SCAR were the twelve Antarctic Treaty Powers.

Member-

ship requirements differ from Antarctic Treaty membership requirements, being only open to countries
"actively engaged in Antarctic research."

16

Inter-

pretation of this requirement, though, has changed.
In 1976, it was resolved that an overwintering station
was not necessary for SCAR membership.

~embership

is

also open to scientists nominated by ICSU and to each
international scientific union federated to ICSU and to
the World Meteorological Organization.

Based at Scott Polar Research Institute in Cambridge,
England, this organization provides the basic channel

16 I n 1967 Belgium closed its Antarctic base and has
not attended a SCAR meeting since.
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for dissemination of information about Antarctic scientific programs.

Each member nation submits an annual report

of its activities.

Full meetings of national delegates

are held every two years.

SCAR is regarded as the

source of scientific advice for Antarctic Treaty Powers
even though no formal link has been developed. 1 7 Antarctic
conservation measures have been implemented on the suggestion
of SCAR.

Specially protected areas on land have been

proposed and the Agreed Measures updated and modified
at the Consulative meetings upon advise of SCAR.

Presently,

the legal and technical factors in krill harvesting are
·
. t'lon. 18
s t u d'le d b y thOlS organQza
b elng

BIOMASS
-

SCAR participated in the development of a program of
Biological Investigation of Marine Antarctic Systems
and Stocks (BIOMASS) which coordinates international
research on the biology of Antarctic living resources.
This ten year international research endeavor was initiated
in 1978.
(1)

In broad terms the objectives of BIOMASS are:

to provide data and information for the conservation

and wise management of the living resources of the Southern
Ocean, and (2)

to improve our understanding of the energy
flow through the ecosystem.1 9 The principle objective
17 IUC N, p. 7.
18Anonymous, p. 804.
19 Everson, p. 135.
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is to gain a deeper understanding of the structure and
functional relationships within the Antarctic marine
ecosystem as a basis for future managemerrt of living
resources. 20

BIOMASS proposals for long term intensifica-

tion of scientific research are concerned with interactions among the resources.

This approach to Antarctic

scientific investigation lends itself nicely to utilization in 'ecosystem approach' management decisions.

BIOMASS is the first major international effort at coordination
of present and future research explicitly for the development of wise management of living resources. 21 As such,
it has several important contacts with other international
organizations.

SCAR already cooperates with several inter-

national bodies including ACMRR of FAO, IOC of UNESCO,
and the International Association of Biological Oceanography ofIUBS.

Financial support comes from tiE Inter-

national Council of Scientific Uions (ICSU), the United
States National Academy of Science and the National Science
Foundation. 22

It has been recommended that BIOMASS respond to relevant
recommendations from the IOC and Antarctic Treaty Consultative Powers.

SCAR may be utilized to transmit the relevant

20BIOMASS, p. H-5.
21 I bi d., p. H-vi.

22BIO~~SS, p. H-vi.; Barnes, James N., Statement in U.S.
Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, Antarctic Living Marine Resources Negotiations. Hearing
before the National Ocean Policy Study, 95th Cong., 2nd sess.
(1978): p. 21.
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scientific information to countries involved in krill
exploration and exploitation.

Also put forward are the

suggestions that IOC undertake the international coordination of BIOMASS and that SCAR collaborate with FAO in
convincing all parties involved of the pertinence of
detailed catch data.

This would allow for partial

United Nations participation on th8 management of krill
resources. 23

Intimately involved in scientific investigation

of Antarctic living resources, SCAR would be no less than
a major asset to an Antarctic conservation regime.
Established relationships with FAO and other organizations
augment the desirability of a formal link with the new
management regime.

Many states are likely to want to participate in krill
management.

A convention will be weakened if international

economic and social concerns are not considered.

The

mechanisms for proper coordination of scientific investigation, non-fishing and

non-resear~h

state involvement,

and overlapping management concerns already exist and
should be utilized within a new Antarctic living marine
resource regime.

The proposed "ecosystem approach"

to krill management will not be complete without a close
working link between the new regime and the IWC.

An

Antarctic living marine resource regime does not have
to contain specific provisions for whale conservation,

23BION~SS, pp. H-vi, H-69.
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but coordination with the IWC will facilitate protection
of the whale stocks.

The ecosystem consciousness of the

BIOMASS program along with SCAR's function as a channel
for international dissemination of information about
Antarctic scientific programs indicates that SCAR will
be helpful
regime.

with respect to management decisions by a new

The FAO Southern Ocean Fishery Program has

already begun compiling and disseminating information
on krill and other Antarctic marine living resources.
There may be some overlap of this function with the BIOMASS
program of SCAR.

Therefore, some collaboration of effort

between these two organizations would benefit the retional
management of the krill resource.

FAO's major function

should not be with implementation of management measures
within the Antarctic, but as a liaison between the
Antarctic marine resource regime and the less-developed
countries and as a forum for expression of LDC views on
Antarctic marine living resources.

Several options are open to the international community.
The four options set forth in the next chapter are not
exclusive.

They have been chosen because of their

obvious applicability and the fact that they are the most
widely discussed alternatives.

Chapter IX
Selected Future Options
International attitudes concerning the most appropriate
management scheme touch upon several differing options.

Most

often discussed methods for resolving the problem of what set
of nations should have the management responsibility for Antarctic living marine resources are: 1) The National Approach,
2) The Condominium Approach, J) A United Nations Regulatory
Body and 4) Negotiation of a new regime for the specific
purpose of living marine resource management (United States
position).

Within each of these categories there are, of

course, variations.

To utilize a certain approach in one

manner will make it acceptable to one group of states (group
A), but not to another group (group B).

To utilize the same

approach in a somewhat different manner will alienate part
of group A and recruit part of group B.

The National Approach
Although this would be the politically easiest method, a
national approach to Antarctic marine

re~~~rce

management

will leave the fate of the ecosystem dependent upon the whims
and wishes of various individual nations.

Attention to the

ecological balance of the area would be of low priority.
Overcapitalization by states in order to take advantage of
the initial boom in the krill fishery could have a noted
detrimental effect throughout the Antarctic ecosystem.
The United States Department of State asserts that the
84
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possibility of overexploitation is small in the immediate
future, but very likely as the fishery grows. 1 Unilateral
action to license fishermen to operate in the Southern Ocean
will undoubtably lead to what may be labeled the "Great
Krill Rush of the 1980's".

National priorities will out-

weigh ecosystem considerations and, as evidenced in Garret
Hardin's "Tragedy of the Commons,,2, short term advantage
would override long-term productivity.

If considered realistically, licensing by a state for its
nationals to fish without consideration for other states is
initially beneficial to very few and ultimately beneficial
to no one.

The assumption is that regulation by individual

countries will be adequate or is uneeded.

However, free

apprOpriation may allow developed states with krill fishing
technology to deplete the resource at the expense of the
resource needs and conservation views of the non-fishing
nations.

Problems of limited management effectivemess,

inconsistent international practice and

i~tability

of the

fishery will endanger the security of any single nation's
investment.

Unless coordinated through formal and/or infor-

mal negotiation of committments, no monitoring of stocks or
reporting of catch data will be required.

The challenge is

1U. S. Department of State, Final EIS, p. 49.
2Hardin, Garrett, "The Tragedy of the Commons," Science
162 (1968): pp. 1243-1248.
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that of finding a balance between the interests of the world
community in regard to nutritional, economic and conservation
desires and those of the krill fishing nations.

Another difficulty encountered is evocation of the claims
issue.

Most of the fishing will take place within 200 nauti-

cal miles of the Antarctic continent, especially within the
overlapping British, Chilean and Argentinean sectors.

Would

such unilateral action by various states by a de jure abrogation of the moratorium found in Article IV of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty.

The, as yet, unresolved nature of the seas

within 200 miles of the Antarctic coast leaves the question
open.

Some may suggest that,with the special case in the

Antarctic}the applicability of international law concerning
sovereignty over a land mass may be reversed.

If the claim-

ants are unable to refute the high seas argument and are
unable to establish territorial seas, contiguous zones or
EEZ's, are they still entitled to assert sovereignty over
the land mass?

Those states which argue that the krill

fishing areas are high seas are, in fact;supporting the
possibility of a national approach to exploitation of Antarctic marine living resources.

It has been argued by some that unilateral action may be
contrary to the purposes of the Antarctic Treaty and, therefore, a violation.

The applicability of the Treaty to

shore areas, though, is open to question.

orf~

If this 'violation'
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argument is found valid, it would apply only to unilateral
action by the nineteen nations which have acceded to the
Treaty.

The rest of the world community is not bound by

the Treaty provisions.

On the other hand, the national

approach may be effectively supported by Article VIII of
the Treaty.

Article VIII maintains jurisdiction over Ant-

arctic personnel by the state of which they are nationals.
Insurance of freedom of movement and guaranteed unrestricted
execution of function are the apparent purposes of this
article.

Even in light of the freeze on the claims issue

(Article IV) ,jurisdiction over personnel within a claimants
sector may be seen as a contradiction of territorial sovereignty in the final analysis.

Again, uncertainty is sired

by contrary interpretations of the provisions of the Treaty.
A demise of the Treaty, though, is not precondition for a
national approach by contracting or non-contracting states.
Unless a strong new regime is negotiated, the national approach
to exploitation of Antarctic krill will become a fait accompli
and may result in confrontation between parties involved.

The Condominium Approach
'Condominium' is defined by Von Glahn as a territory jointly
governed by two or more states. 3 Joint sovereignty in the,
Antarctic may be comprised of only states within the Antarctic

3Von Glahn, p. 78.
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Treaty system or be open to all states within the international community.

The condominium agreement may be part

of the present Treaty or under a new convention.

Once again

we encounter the disputes between claimants and non-claimants
and between the Antarctic Treaty Group and the world community.

It has been suggested that joint sovereignty could be negotiated by the Antarctic Treaty Group under Articles IX or
XII of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty.
dispute

~n

Article IX provides for

this case juridical dispute) resolution by nego-

tiation or some other peaceful means.

Article XII allows

the Treaty to be modified or amended at any time by unanimous
agreement of the contracting parties. Rose argues that such
an arrangement would offer final solution to the claims issue
with all parties sharing equal rights.

Claimants would have

to relinquish claims, but would have sovereign rights over
the whole area.

She also maintains that "clear recognition

of sovereignty would provide a settlement which could affect
the legal order necessary for commercial interests.,,4

It

may reconcile conflicting claims by asserting indivisible,
collective sovereign rights to all of the Antarctic and by
distributing the benefits of resource development among the
co-owners.
facilitated.

Acquisition of scientific data would also be
Already in a cooperative frame, scientific

4Ros e, Julia, "Antarctic Condominium: Building a New
Legal Order for Commercial Interests," Marine Technology
Society Journal 10 (January 1976): p. 26,27.
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interaction between the Consultative parties could be more
easily extended to cover marine living resources.

A declara-

tion of joint sovereignty may enable the Antarctic to be
considered a "coastal state" and benefit from rights of the
1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea as well as
other rights provided by present Law of _.the Sea negotiations.
A condominium may not be legally considered a state, but may
be adequate to obtain benefit from these Conventions.

By

providing for delimitation of the offshore areas, this approach
may also exclude an

international authority, established

by UNCLOS III, from within 200 miles of the Antarctic
continent.

'Joint sovereignty' would incorporate the national interests
of all parties involved and may provide the possibility of a
permanent settlement.

Several examples of past condominiums

have been cited as evidence of feasibility.5 These examples
are not of paralled nature with the overall situation in the
Antarctic and most of them were ultimately unsuccessful.
The problem with using other analogies is in the status of
the territory.

In the Antarctic there are conflicting terri-

torial claims and a major treaty in force.

The political

situation of the area is different from the examples cited.
5Samoa 1878 (United States, United Kingdom, and Germany);
New Hebrides 1906 (Great Britain and France); Canton and
Enderbury Island 1939 (United States and Great Britain);
Spitzbergen 1912 (Norway, Sweden and the Soviet Union).
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Legal uncertainties corne to the forefront.

One writer argues

that a consultative party condominium is unacceptable under
international law.

If no authority exists to impose sovereign

control over individual sector claims, then there is no
authority to impose sweeping rights of sovereignty over the
entire area. 6 Gustav Smedal, though, maintains that agreement
of all parties concerned (i.e. the Antarctic Treaty Group or
Consultative States) is a valid qualification for the proclamation of sovereignty.? However, it may be argued that a
condominium of consultative parties would violate Article IV
provisions of the Antarctic Treaty which bar any enlargement
of claims.

If this is so, an entire new treaty may be needed

to set up a condominium, in which case nations not presently
within the Antarctic Treaty Group may be allowed access.

There are several areas of difficulty to be noted.

If a

condominium is comprised of states with and without consultative status, the territorial claims of the seven claimant
states will be undermined.

How will the -Jurisdictional

position of these claimants be appeased?

It may also be

possible for consultative parties, through regulatory provisions, to effect a de facto condominium (such as a joint
venture system), but this would exclude the non-Antarctic
6Anonymous, p. 843.
?Smedal, Gustav, "Acquisition of Sovereignty Over Polar
Areas," (1931) :11, cited by Rose, p. 27.
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Treaty Group states.
excluded?

What of access by those initially

A condominium may be a feasible solution as long

as the world community of 'small' powers is granted membership and equality.

The caveat here is that the 'small'

states must not feel dominated by the 'large' states.

They

should maintain at least the level of sovereign equality as
j

that provided in the United Nations General Assenbly.

However,

the condominium approach is not regarded as a politically
expedient alternative.

Agreement will be difficult to reach

and in the meantime, the national approach will have been
adopted by default.

United Nations Regulatory Agency
Common interest in the Antarctic was asserted by India (a
leader of less-developed-countries) as early as 1926.

More

recently, representatives from Sri Lanka have argued for
international control. 8 Therefore, the less-developed-countries
(IDC) have not acquiesced to permanent rule of the Antarctic by
exclusive interests.

The United Nations would provide the

broad spectrum of internationalization needed to satisfy the
LDC's.

It is possible for the United Nations to exercise

some form of administrative control with one of its specialized
agencies.
role.

The FAC is the most clearly visible choice for this

A second alternative is for the United Nations to con-

vene an international conference to consider the Antarctic
8Anonymous, p. 843.

question.
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This would bring many other states into the pic-

ture and marshall political pressure for their inclusion in
the final settlement. 9 The United Nations, though, has already
convened UNCIOS III.

It was made clear in Geneva in 1975

that the status of the Antarctic territory is not linked
with issues being considered by the present Law of the Sea
Conference.

President Amerasinghe of UNCLOS III stated that

"the question of status of the Antarctic is in no way linked
with the issues before the Conference on the Law of the Sea
10
and, therefore, this question should not delay agreement."
It is assumed that the Antarctic problem will only further
delay the already stifled LOS negotiations.

The establishment of an administrative agency would seem the
most feasible of the two proposed United Nations alternatives.
One author argues that a specialized agency of the United
Nations General Assembly would be the most suitable mechanism
and that a separate United Nations "Neutral Territories
Council" for the Antarctic could be established. 11 A new
administrative agency, however, is not necessary specifically
for marine living resources of the area.

It is asserted by

Jessup and Taubenfeld that "the precedents exist for use,
exploitation, and administration on a shared basis, and a
9 I bi d . p. 854.

10Quoted in Wilson, G., p. 5.
llHayton, "Polar Problems and International Law," American
Journal of International Law 52 (1958):p. 765 in Anonymous,
p. 854.
--
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number of international agencies already in existence can
H1 2
The FAD
be utilized with relatively little further ado.
has expressed interest in a joint program with UNDP to assist
in exploration and utilization of krill for LDC's.13

FAD has

the experience and technical competence which could make it
an effective administrator for global krill concerns.

An FAD

Southern Ocean Fisheries Program with a northern boundary of
45 0 South is already in existence.

Yet, for more effective

administration and management of krill it would be necessary
for thi s boundary to be moved southward to the latitude most
compatible with the Antarctic Convergence. (In the next option
considered in this study, movement of the boundary will be
unnecessary.)

Aside from the advantage for LDC's of a United

Nations regulatory agency, interests of developed states may
also be advanced.

For example, there may be

insur~d

continued

availability of the Antarctic waters for science and a settlement which would continue the presence of a peaceful regime. 14
12 Jessup, P. and H. Taubenfeld, Controls for Outer Space
and the Antarctic Analogy (1959) :p. 137-1~O, in Wilson, G.,
p. 59.
13Barnes, James N., Statement in U.S. Congress, Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, Antarctic
Livin Marine Resources Ne otiations. Hearin before the
National Ocean Policy Study, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., 1978):
p. 36.
14Britain, Chile and Argentina may make a graceful exit
from the longstanding feud of overlapping offshore claims.
Anonymous, p. 858.
The Unlikely assumption here is that these states will
accept the United Nations regulatory solution.
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Doubt exists, though, as to the sensibility of abandonment of
the somewhat successful Antarctic Treaty machinery for the
political uncertainties of the Uni t ed Nations.

The Antarctic

continent would have to be declared res communis and would
require states to forfeit all claims of sovereignty.

The

Antarctic Treaty Group has reacted negatively to past overtures by FAO with respect to the Antarctic.

With this in mind,

it may not be politically feasible for the United Nations to
intervene.

To expedite a settlement, the best solution for

United Nations involvement will be to have a strong institutional
relationship between a United Nations agency (FAO) and a new
regime to be adopted.

United States Position

The United States is one of the principal players in
discussions of the commercial development and management
of living Antarctic marine resources.

The Antarctic

Treaty is the cornerstone of United States Antarctic
policy.

During 1978 Senate hearings on exploitation of

Antarctic resources, the Department of State asserted
that the creation of a conservation convention should
come from within the Antarctic Treaty System and be
consistent with the principles and purposes of the Treaty.15
15Mi nk, Patsy, (Assistant Secretary of State for
Oceans and International Environment and Scientific
Affairs) Statement in U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee
on Foreign Relations, Exploitation of Antarctic Resources.
Hearin before the Subcommittee on Arms Control Oceans
and International Environment, 95th Cong., 2nd sess. 1978): p. 19.
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Since the Treaty does not expressly prohibit commercial

-

activities, they will be permitted.

It is hoped that the

activities will conform to provisions of the Treaty.
The United States has long maintained that there should
be free access to all parts of the area, except specially
designated areas, to develop natural resources under uniform
16
and non-preferential rules applicable to all nations.
The United States does not want to prejudice its territorial
position and has always reserved basic historic rights
to the continent.

The right to make a claim is reserved,

but official position maintains the area as terra nullius.
Accordingly, none of the seven claims are officially
acknowledged since the United States does not recognize
that valid criteria for assertion of sovereignty have been
met.

The 1924 statement of disavowal by United States

Secretary of State Hughes is the classic locution.

"It is

the opinion of the Department that the discovery of lands
unknown to civilization, even when coupled with a formal
taking of possession, does not support a valid claim
of sovereignty unless the discovery is followed by an
actual settlement of the discovered territory. "17
l6Ray, Dixy Lee, (Assistant Secretary of State, and
Chairman Antarctic Policy Group) Statement in U. S. Congress,
Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Antarctic
Polic. Hearin before the Subcommittee on Oceans and
International Environment, 9 th Cong., 1st sess. 1975): p. 16.
This is a minority view among the Contracting Parties
and would permit participation in a management regime by
nonsignatories.
l7Bernhardt, Peter A., "Sovereignty in Antarctica,"
article in U. S. Congress, Ibid., p. 95.
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There has been debate over the "effectiveness" of occupation
and what in fact constitutes a legitimate settlement.
Though immovable in its stance of non-recognition of
claims, the United States does not want the new regime
to compromise the legal position of claimants or non-claimants.

It wouid seem that basic United States policy objectives
are governed by:
1)

maintenance of the Antarctic Treaty;

2)

protection of the environment and preservation of the ecosystem;

3)

rational development of new sources of protein, and;

4)

prevention of international conflict.

How may the United States best protect its interests
and position in the Antarctic?

Solutions to the question

must consider that the United States has no claim or
krill fishing operation. 18 It may be in the best national
interest of the United States to have as many nations
as possible with a legal stake in the regime. 19

Resource concerns cannot be completely discounted.

The

18 I t will take considerable investment for the U. S.
to begin fishing. We may be able to utilize tuna boats.
Shrimpers are not capable of fishing the Antarctic waters.
Wallace, Davi d . (Associate Administrator for Marine
Resources, NOAA, Dept. of Commerce) Statement in U. S.
Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
Fisheries Miscellaneous. Hearings before the Subcommittee
on Fisheries and Wildlife conservation and the Environment
and the Subcommittee on Merchant Marine on Antarctic
Fisheries Agreement, 95th Cong., 1st sess. (1977): p. 283.
Only the ~ast desirable area is left for claim,
therefore, it is not advantageous GO make a claim or
recognize existing claims.
19 Anonymous, p. 858.
Two main approaches have been suggested for determining
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United States realizes the possibility of detrimental
impacts from an uncontrolled harvest.

A conservation

regime is being strongly urged because of the dangers
of large-scale fishing.

A krill harvest is somewhat

limited by technology, though advancements in technique
and equipment are beginning to make it feasible for several
states.

A treaty is not necessary to authorize fishing,

but will be needed for sound management.

The present

diligent push for a conservation regime stems partially
from the realization that, once concluded, it may take
several years to enter into force and become fUlly
operational. 20

In the recent Environmental Impact

Statement of the Department of State, it was noted that
the United States may have to rely on lack of technology
rather than 'legality' to hold harvests well below the
possibility of impact for the immediate future . 21 A
whether a nation may participate. First, an "activity
criterion" would be enforced allowing only nations engaged
in harvesting and research to participate. The U. S.
viewpoint is that the convention by open to all states
for accession, but allow participation in decisions only
by those meeting an "interest criterion." - Ocean Science News (Nautilus Press Inc., Washington D.C. ,
November 13, 1978) 20: p. 5.
20Brewster, Robert. (Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
Affairs) Statement in U. S. Congress, Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, Exploitation of Antarctic Resources. p. 34.
2lU. S. Department of State, Final EIS, p. 49.
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sound conservation regime is required for 'long term'
management.

Scientific research is also of concern.

The United States

has a commitment to both basic and applied studies of
the Antarctic environment.

Perhaps an incentive to preserve

the Antarctic Treaty arises from the fact that freedom
of scientific research is being so restricted by the
current UNCLOS negotiations.

Current policy for the

Antarctic is to strengthen and maintain international
cooperative research in several major scientific disciplines
in "harmony with and in reinforcement of the principles
and purposes of the Antarctic Treaty.,,22

Basically, the active and conservative United States
position is due to:

1)

lack of data for rational management decisions;

2)

maintenance of territorial stance;

3)

scientific freedom, and;

4)

prevention of international conflict.

_.

The United States assumes that the requirements for
effective conservation are not incompatible with harvesting
of living resources.

Though the United States does not

fish krill, it realizes that much of the data will have
22Slaughter, John B., (Assistant Director for Astronomical,
Atmospheric, Earth and Ocean Sciences, National Science
Foundation Statement in U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee
on Foreigh Rel a t i ons , Exploitation of Antarctic Resources.
p. 52.
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to corne from fishing and that a regime will make organiza23
tion and compilation of data easier and more efficient.
Therefore, the United States supports the negotiation of
and conclusion of an international agreement to conserve
Antarctic marine living resources.

The agreement should

set forth the objectives and provide for necessary obligations, functions and machinery for the purpose of rational
utilization.

The United States will continue to support

scientific research and has made it clear

it would
24
contribute to the cost of running the organization.
th~

Specifically, the United States wishes to see harvesting
take place in accordance with a conservation standard
incorporating an "ecosystem approach" rather than a
fisheries agreement along conventional lines. 25 The
following is an attempt to itemize characteristic points
of the conservation standard the United States would like
to see included in the text of the convention.

There

should be:
1)

maximum annual production on a continuing basis

2)

maintenance of the balance between and among
harvest and non-harvest species

3)

prevention of irreversible changes to the ecosystem

23The Antarctic Krill Boat Bill (H. R. 12668) died
in the Senate last year. The bill would have provided
a $20 million authorization to the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration to acquire a polar research
vessel to evaluate krill resources with the aim of
developing a commercial krill fishery.
Ocean Science News (October 16, 1978) 20: p. 4.
24 U. S. Dept. of State, Final EIS, p. 64.
25Barnes, Jim, "Memo-Special Consulative Meeting.
Canberra, p. 4.

4)
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coverage of all species south of the Antarctic
Covergence except whales and seals.

5)

a commission of contracting parties with an
effective decision making system to develop, adopt
and revise conservation measures

6)

an independent scientific committee to advise
the commission and publish reports

7)

a secretariat

8)

an obligation by members to provide data on the
harvest

9)

obligatory compliance with conservation measures

10)
11)

close coordination with the IWC and Sealing
Convention
cooperative relationships with other Intergovernwith

mentali~on-intergovernmentalorganizations
simila~ or related responsibilities

12)

financial obligations by members

IJ)

provision for accession by other states when they
become active
no effect on the claims issue. 26

14)

When asked which of these points would be absolutely
essential for a management regime from the United States
viewpoint, Secretary Brewester did not al!gw much
condensation of the list.

In the Department of State's

judgment the following points are all vital:
1)

ecosystem standard,

2)

obligations and mechanisms for developing the
necessary information base,

J)

commission,

26 u. S. Dept. of State, Final EIS, pp. l-J.
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4)

scientific body,

5)

contracting party obligations,

6)

non-prejudicial juridical provisions,

7)

cooperation and coordination with other appropriate international organizations, and

8)

provision to encourage all states with harvesting 27
or research activity to participate.

Brewster has also called for interim measures including:
1)

observation of a conservation standard set in
the convention and of a ceiling on harvesting,

2)

exchange of scientific data,

3)

establishment of the means of coordi nation and
cooperation in collection and exchange of data, and

4)

a commitment to ra~ifY the convention within
a certain period. 2

The ever-present issue of jurisdiction provides one of the
more difficult hurdles.

Official United States position has

it that there should be no prejudicial aspects of the
upcoming krill management regime.

The United States

maintains a regime can be put into place which will force
no nation to change its position in regard--to Antarctic
claims.

However, the United States would like to see krill

managed by members of the convention instead of states with
27Brewster, Statement in U. S. Congress, Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations, Exploitation of Antarctic
Resources, p. 35.
28 u. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Exploitation of Antarctic Resources, p. 5.
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recognized or non-recognized jurisdiction.

In the words

of Department of State Office of Ocean Affairs representative,
Tucker Scully, "Hopefully there will be a system in which
the treaty would apply to areas beyond national jurisdiction as well as to areas where, in our view, there
is national jurisdiction.,,29

In other words, states with

jurisdiction would delegate specific management authority
to the new commission, but may still gain extra benefit
through license fees.

The United States delegation to the

Special Consultative meetings has made no concession regarding
control of access to alleged EEZ's.

In the view of one

delegate, the claimant states are attempting to enhance
their Antarctic claims through the mechanism of the proposed
living resources regime.

Any yielding on the part of

the United States(and other non-claimants) would upset
the status quo established in the Antarctic Treaty.JO

The United States does not want the regime to function in
isolation from other international organizations or conventions.
Commitments undertaken by the regime should be consistent
with obligations under other international ~greements
pertaining to the Antarctic. 31 Of concern is which organizations
29For example, the Scotia Sea north of 60 0 South may be
claimed by whoever has sovereignty over the Falkland or
Malvinas Islands.
Scully, Tucker. (Representative of the Dept. of State)
Statement in U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce,
Science and Transportation, Antarctic Living Marine Resources
Ne otiations. Hearin before the National Ocean Polic Stud,
95th Cong., 2nd sess. 1978: p. 7.
30Barnes, "Memo-Special Consultative Meeting, Canberra,"pp.16,17.
31There has been little discussion at the Special
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are appropriate and what the specific links will entail.
For example, the United States is concerned that there by
proper United Nations representation or contact.

Specifically,

the FAO should be invited because of its series of programs
and interests in the Southern Ocean. 32 The FAO would be
invited in an observer and/or advisory capacity.

On the

other hand, attempts to establish financial obligations
in the new regime in proportion to shares paid to the
United Nations has met with definite rejection by the
United States and some other states.

The United States

also opposes entry of the Antarctic into the Law of the
Sea negotiations because of the additional burden and
delay which would be caused.

It would be harder for

the United States tomfluencethe outcome at UNCLOS III
than it would with a small group of interested states.

Particulars of official United States position are difficult
to determine for several reasons.

First, due to the nature

of the consultative meetings, the negotiating draft of the
Antarctic Living Marine Resource Ma na gement regime is
classified and confidential.

Details of proposals of all

involved states are held from the public eye.

Second,

the United States position is a product of the opinions
and actions of

several governmental agencies.

The

Consultative Meetings as to how relationships with bodies other
than SCAR and SCOR will be worked out.
Barnes, Jim, "Memo-Special Consultative meeting, Buenos
Aires, p. 26.
32Brewester, Statement in U. S. Congress, Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations, Exploitation of Antarctic
Resources, p. 24.
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essential actors are outlined below.

The Antarctic Policy Group (APG) of the Department of State
was established on 10 April 1965 to provide a more specific
arrangement for the formulation of Antarctic policy than
previously existed.

Orignally the National Security Council's

Operations Coordinating Board
function for Antarctic policy.

main~ained

the oversight

This was dissolved in

1961 when the Department of State assumed coordination of
United States Antarctic operations.

The APG was created

with the agreement of the Secretary of Defense, and the
Director of the National Science Foundation and with the
concurrence of the Secretary of Commerce and Secretary
of Interior.

Membership in the APG consisted of the

heads of the Department of State, Department of Defense,
and the National Science Foundation with other agencies
able to participate by invitation. J J

The Department of State's Bureau for International Organization Affairs had main responsibility for -the Antarctic
until 1970.

At that time the Secretary of State appointed

the Director of the Bureau of International Scientific
and Technological Affairs to represent the Department and
chair the APG.

In the same year, the National Security

Council recommended, and the President approved, the National

JJ Ray , Statement in U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee
on Foreign Relations, ~ S. Antarctic Folicy, p. J.

-'
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Science Foundation to receive the bulk of the budget
for the United States Antarctic program.

The Office of

Management and Budget approved the details.

The Office

of International Scientific and Technological Affairs
has since been reorganized into the Bureau for Oceans
and International Environment and Scientific Affairs. J 4

Over the. years the National Science Foundation's funding
and management responsibilities have increased.

They now

have the major planning, funding and management responsibility for all United States Government activities in the
Antarctic.

The Foundation provides funds for scientists,

academic institutions and agencies of the Federal Government.

National Science Foundation funds have also

supported Antarctic programs by

th~

National Oceanic

and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)

I

the United States

Geological Survey, and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration.

Logistic support is purchased from the

Departments of Defense and Transportation and from a
private commercial contractor. J 5

Such control enabled

the National Science Foundation to effectively enforce
provisions of the Agreed Measures for Conservation of
Antarctic Flora and Fauna until such time as they became
legally binding.

The United States, on 28 October 1978,

J4___
· d_., p. 4 .
I b1
J5Slaughter, Statement in U. S. Congress, Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations, Exploitation of Antarctic
Resources, p. 50.

106
ratified the Agreed Measures by passage of the Antarctic
Conservation Act of 1978 (PL95-541).

The Department of

Commerce, in the form of NOAA, has also played an important
role.

NOAA and its antecedents have been involved

continuously since the International Geophysical Year.
NOAA scientists participated in the major United states
survey work on krill in the 1960's and have worked on
krill estimation projects with FAO and SCAR. 36 According
to some reports, the NOAA has been slowly absorbing the
leadership role from the National Science Foundation. 37
The National Science Foundation will more than likely not
allow the leadership to slip away,

especially in light

of the fact that the United States Antarctic Program
recently received a 22.3 percent boost in funds.

More

than 70 percent of the increase is for expansion of research
on the Antarctic's ecosystem and krill. 38

The President, of course, must have a role in Antarctic
policy formation.

In his Environmental Message of 23 May 1977.

the President assigned great importance to international
cooperation and United States leadership in the Antarctic.

36Leventhal~ Paul L. (Assistant Administrator, Office
of Policy and Planning, NOAA. Department of Commerce) Statement in U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Exploitation of Antarctic Resources, p. 43.
370cean Science News, (1 January 1979) 21: p. 1.
380cean Science News, (22 January 1979) 21:

p. 4.
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National policy is promulgated by Presidential directive
and devloped through the National Security Council. 39
Coordination among interested federal agencies with incorporation of the views of Congress and the pUblic all play
a part in development of our Antar8tic policy.

Some

complaint has arisen because of the entry of resource
agencies into what was once the exclusive realm of diplomats
and scientists.

Competition and conflict among

makers is not unusual.

policy~

The fear is that the resource

agencies are not concerned with maintenance of the
Antarctic Treaty.40

39S1aughter, Statement in U. S. Congress, Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations, Exploitation of Antarctic
Resources, p. 52.
A 1973 NSC Decision Memorandum stated that the U. S.
position would be within the bounds of international law
and that unilateral action by any state would be unacceptable. :
Rose, Julia, "Antarctic Condominium: Building a New Legal
Order for Commercial Interests," Marine Technology Society
Journal 10 (January 1976): p. 23.
40 Rose, p. 23.

Chapter X
CONCLUSION
More specific guidelines are needed for sound management
of Antarctic marine living resources than those provided
by the 1958 Geneva Conventions, the 1959 Antarctic
Treaty and the Informal Composite Negotiating Text.
The effects of non-management are undesirable for both
the resource and the industry.

Two prior Antarctic

industries have exploited their way down the path of
extinction.

The whaling business, with its highly efficient

floating factory ships and unlimited range, combined with
the late arrival and ineptness of the International
Whaling Commission, led to the demise of both the whale
populations and the enterprise.

The Antarctic Fur Seal

population was decimated in the later 18th and early 19th
centuries.

This industry moved systematically thrqugh and

totally cropped many breeding colonies.
left at dangerously low numbers.

The stocks were

These seals were saved

from extinction because low population levels made
exploitation uneconomical.

Likewise, failure to treat

krill as a renewable resource will have similar if not
more detrimental repercussions because of the important
role in the ecological system as seen in Chapter II.

The

possible effects of uncontrolled exploitation are

understood.

The question is not whether the krill stocks

should be managed, but who may have input into the management scheme.

As noted, several nations are already actively
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engaged in the harvest.

1C9
No bilateral or multilateral

agreements specifically for krill management as yet exist.
The present unilateral approach to the krill fishery has
not reached an uncontrollable level.

The fishery, obviously,

is not the exclusive interest of a single state, nor is it
reserved for a small group of nations.

The cry for krill

exploitation benefit is heard from both developed and lessdeveloped-countries.

Because of the speed with which the

fishery may develop, international agreement on a managemant policy is essential.

The advantages of an internatior.al management regime outweigh
the disadvantages.

Gains will be made toward functional and

peaceful reconciliation of the problem.
in the fishery will be more secure.

National investment

International management

of the unique and nearly pristine environment will aid in
scientific research and data exchange.

1

Rational management

will aid in equitable distribution of benefits from krill
exploitation.

Claimant states forsake the possibility that

non-claimants will eventually recognize tenuous territorial
claims and allow 'exclusive' resource management.

( Such

official recognition is an unlikely possibility.)

States

such as Chile and Argentina will argue that the international
gains are being made at their expense because the krill
resource is mostly located within 'their' sectors.

Con t r o l

1 Anonymous , "Thaw in International law? Rights in
Antarctica Under the law of Common Spaces," Th e Yale la'll
Journal 87 (March 1978): p. 857.

lle
by states over waters within 2ce miles of the Antarctic

mainland, though, has yet to be recognized.

Th ey will,

therefore, be giving up something which is not understood
to be legally theirs by the world

~ommunity.

The Antarctic may be an ideal location for application and
testing of the theory of functionalism.

2

The krill resource

should be seen as a step in utilization of the Antarctic as
a ·.functional workshop for international political and
scientific cooperation.

It should not be utilized as merely

a political arena for sustenance of conflict, but as a
cooperative pursuit of common interests.

The national

selfishness of the states concerned can be utilized in an
organized manner by the development of economic and social
cooperation.

However, agreement should not be postponed

until it becomes politically impos8ible to negotiate.

Only

a few nations have the capital and technology for Antarctic
fishing operations.

Frustration of less-developed-countries

caused by complete exclusion from any krill management scheme
presents the danger that they may eventually circumvent the
treaty.

Folitical, environmental and economical disruption

are the possible results.

If they find themselves at a

permanent disadvantage, the regime could be rendered meaningless by future wild-cat operations.

Na t i on s without the

capability to fish krill will wish to have some input into

2Claude, Inis, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares, ( New York:
Random House, 1971 ): pp. 378-407.
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a krill management regime.

To accomodate these nations, the

FAO should be incorporated into the new regime in an advisory
capacity and be used as a forum for expression of non-krillfishing nations' interests.

The new regime, negotiated

through a special conference, should establish close working
institutional relationships with the United Nations (FAO) ,
I~C,

and the Antarctic Treaty System (including SCAR) and

be compatible with general guidelines of each.

FAO,

I~C,

and the Antarctic Treaty Group alr8ady play important roles
in the Southern Ocean and have as members the principal krill
fishing nations.

Each may assist in the smooth operation of

any Antarctic marine living resource management regime.

There are three types of membership provisions, as suggested
by Koers, for international organizations.

'Closed membership'

will limit the regime to the states which ratify the agreement.
'Conditionally open membership' will allow other states to
become members provided they meet certain

re~uirements.

'Unconditionally open membership' will allow any state
to become a member.

There are two possibY€ points-of-view.

One is that membership in internat5.onal organizations
should include as many states as possible.

The second

holds that, in order to keep decision-making uncomplicated,
membership should be limited to states with an active
interest.

Of course, the conditions limiting membership

should be based on factors related to the objectives of
the organization.

Wh e t h e r or not a state is member of
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another international organization (i.e. the ATG or FAC)
should not be a limiting factor.

~ e mb e r s h i p

in any manage-

ment regime for Antarctic krill should be open to or.ly
those states actively engaged in exploitation or exploration
of the resource.

One reason for this specific limitation

is that membership in any international organization
usually entails financial obligations.

States with no

interest in the objectives of the regime will have no
interest in upholding financial obligations and may have
possibly acceded to the treaty for some unrelated political
purpose.

It is recognized that states with no present

active interest in the krill resource may become active
in the future.

~ith

this in mind, 'conditionally open

membership' is preferable, assuming that restrictions on
membership do not result in the regime becoming an organization to further the interests of only its small group
of members.

~embership

regulations must be based on sound

management principles rather than political motives of
the original signatories.
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ANNEX I
Antarctic Treaty of 1959
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An ta r r- tic

Sign ed at Washington December 1,1959;
Ratification advise lJy tht' S en I e of th e United. States of America

August 10, 1960;
Ralified by the Presid ent of the ['nited Slales of America August 18,

1960;
Ratification of the [ 'nitel1 Slales of America d eposited at Jf'a"hinglon

AugusI1 8 1960;
Proclaim ed by th e Presulen of the United S'a res of A m erica
June 23 1961 ;
Entered into f o rce June 23, 1961.
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the Charter of t h e Unit ed Xut ions r]"]
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE

I

1. Antarcti ca shn.l l he used for peaceful purroses only. There
shall be prohibited, int er nlin, any mea sures of a military nature, su ch
as the estnhli shrnent of military ba ses and fortifi cations, the carrying
out. of military maneuvers, as well as the test ing' of nny type of
weapon s,
:2. Th o fir p.- pnt Treaty " h a ll not prevent thl' use of rn il itu ry person nel o r' eq u ip me n t for scientific res ea rch or for any oth er p eaceful
purpose,
,A RT I CL E

Tr

FrCt,,[,. 1I\ of srie ut ific invc st ignr iou i f, .\ nta rct ica. and coo pe r a t io n
II) \qrc! that I'nel, as applied during the Internut ionul Geophysical
Ypar, s ha ll continue. s ubject to th e pro vision s of th e present Treaty.
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.\RTICLE

II I

1. In ord er' to prUlllflte iut ernut ion n l coo pc r.i r io u in ~;l ' i ell t i l i ("
inv est ig ut io n in :\ n t,,,...t ieu, as provided [o r ill A/t il'l f' II of rh., present
T re ut y , the ('u lll r';lct !ng P arti es agree t luit, t o rllt' grp:tt.-::.t ex ten t
f,"I,;il,le a nd p ra d il" aL I,· ;

(a ) in form a t iou J"I'I_!':Ircling pl .m s for ",·i.'lI ti tic pmg-r:lIl\ 5 in
Anru rct icn shu ll be eX"ha ngec! to permit m n x irn u m ecol lolIl)" and
p !l j,' i (' !l (')
I' operu t ion s ;
(b) ,;eie nt itic p"r' '-' II Il £>l sh a ll be exc ha nged ill A nt arc t ica herween
expecli t io ns a nd sta t i " II.~ ;
(c ) sc ie n t i fic obs e rvur io ns a nrl resul t s from Ant arct icu sha ll be
exchang ed a nd iliad ,' f ...' ely nva ilubl e.

2. In imple meut inj; thi s Arti cle, every encou rage m en t sh a ll be
given to t he est ul.li sluuenr o f coo pe rn t ive worki ng' re l.ir ion s w it h those
S!,e.'iali zl'd Agelicie::: of th e L'nit ed Nations and ot he r inte ru at ion nl
o rga n iz:lt illns hu ving a scie n t itic or technical int e rost in Antu rct icn.
ARTI CL E

1.

IV

Xot h ing con tai ned in the p re sent Treaty sh n ll be interpret ed as :

(a) :1 renunciation by un} Contracting Part y of p reviously
assert ed right s o f or clai ms tu t rri t oria l sove reign ty in A n turrt ica :
(b ) n reuuu ci.u ion or diminut ion by u ny Con I [";lrting Pa rt) of
allY bnsis of c la im to territorial so ve rc-ijruty ill A nt.u-er ica wh ich
it, mu v ha ve wh ether as u result of it s uvt ivit ies o r lh o:'e o f it s
nat io/; ab ill Aurn ret icu, or otherwise;
(e) prcjudi cinjr the pos ition o f any ('olllra.·t ing Party as r('ganls
its r ecog nit ion or lion -rec ogu it ion of a n)' or her :-'tall" " right o f or
«lu un or L:I,-i,.; o f «l.um to ll'ITil ol,i;t! :'ol',' r .· i ~lI t y in A nt a rct icu .
•j
:\0 :I.'t,.; o r nct ivit ios takin;.! pla,',> wh i le IL l' pr,'~P l l t Treat y is in
force -h a ll con-t it ute :\ ba si " 1'01' ai=;'l'rtin!!, :'n p po l'f il1 )! or d enyin)! :\
rl n u n tl) 1,' IT; t" l'ia l ,;o \'e l"l· ig n ty ill Aut a rvt i... :1 Ill' .'l"t':Ut' any righ t,; o f
'. )\· l' r l'i .~ q J t y ill .Vu tu rvt icn. Xo 111'\1' rl n iru, o r " l:h :'g rrH.'nt of a n
,'\; , ri:W " h int, to 1"ITitori al '::O\"-I't'ig llty i l l ,\lI la !',·t i.':1 , 1. " 11 1,,, a:,:,,'rt" d
',I 1 , : \ 11" ' t il 'l,,Cl' l l ! Tn·"ty i:, in for l"-.
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>I :t· d i'<I,""al "I' 1': ltlj,,:It·, i\',' I\'l~t l' 1I 1:1t !'l'i:tl. ttl \"'l i.·11 all .d' rhl' Con I I' ;( ,' ! 'I l~ 1':11'1I ":' 1\ I" l'-( ' l't' l II't >," 1I1.1I i\ . ' ~ :In' . ' I : t u le.l ro !'an i.·jp:lt.' i ll ti ll'
1l 1t'1 'i i l : :! ~ (II·,)·.-i" .,,, t'lf' IIl1 d "I' ,\ r li,, 11' I\. :1/'0 > p:1l1 iv-, ri ll ' rul e-, l''' i:t!,I, ~l. ,' d ' lIid\' I' -,/,,11 :l.c:T I' I' llil ' lll- , I. tll :l l' l dy : !, ' \ ' ll: l r d i , ·:l.
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Thr. p" I) \'i ,..io n~ o f rhe pre"e l!~ Treaty "ha ll a p l' ly 10 t lu- area ,,011 111
o f filp ~Illlt h La! it tule, inc"Il.lin!!: ;11 1 i/'!' ..dIP IYt''' . hilt not hi ll!!: in the
p n ·.-;t·l\1 T ro.uy shall pr ejudice (II' ill a llY lI'ay afred the r ight '", or th e
p ,;:t' rc i"l~ of 111\' r ig ht ", o f allY ~I a t e u nd er inr e run t io u ul luw \\ it h regard
I I)

th e h i~h se us w it hiu that urea.

1. I I ~ o nli-r I II p r" lllo! t' lh t' "I,jl ;ct i\'l's .uu l cn - ur» the ol--c rv n nce o f
rill' p r' )\' i ~ i l ol l '" of ri ll' p rvscn t T ri-u t v, c.rc h C IJI,traeting l 'a rty wh ose
l'l ' !, rl',:'['IlLll i vr-- n re r- nt it I..·" (0 p u rt ivi pa te ill t lie ITll'l'tin l!" r eferred to
ill .\r-t id l' I X. o f t lu- T reur y sh a ll ha n ' the righl to d l's igll a te observers
til ( 'a[T~ o ur a llY in :,!'edioll providr«] for hy the p n ';"f'llt Art icl .
OI>:' CI'\ ' (' l',=' s h a ll hI' n;l! io n:d " of the ('olltradin g' I'u rt ies whi ch d esignate t hom. T he n::I,jI'" of ob serve rs shall he comm I icnt cd to e ve r v
ot he r C"o lltnwtillg Pany IUl\'illg the right to d p sigllat e ol» -r ve rs , all;]
likv IH,r;, ',' - ha l] he ~i\"t' n of the n-rtu innt inu of their appointment.
,) E a ·:h Oh:il! IT l' r d . ·"i~.malt'd in ac cordance with the. provisions of
p:trag-I :q ,h 1 of (h i.. A r t i,' I\' sh a ll IWH' complete freedom of ac cess at
anv t im- to nnv 01' a ll n ro us of .\ n l :l rd ica .
i .\11 a rc a; of ~\Il n rc t icu including all st nt ion s, in st ul lat ions and
eq u i p ureu t wit hi n Iho:' n rrns, :11111 all s h ips and ni rcru f t at p oin t s of
d i ,;dwr!-"in~ o r ('m hark in~ ('a q! o ': 0 1' person nel in Ant : rc t ica , s h a ll be
open at a ll times to iu s] "I io n h. ' any observers design ated in accordnnce wit h pamgrap 1 1 o f I his A rt icle,
4. Aei-i a l 01 rva ion may be ca r r ied out a t a llY ti m e over :my o r
all areas of Antn rc r i 'a II)' any o f t he Co n t ruct in rr P art ies h av ing th
rig-ht to drsig-natc ob se rvers.
,
5. Ea ch Cont rn ct imr Party shall, at the time when the p resent
Treaty enters into force f o r it, infonn the other Contracting Parties,
and thereafter sh a ll gi\'c them notice in udvance, of

(a) a ll ex pe di t io ns to anti within A nt arctica, on the part of its
ships or national s, and all expeditions to Antarctica organized in
or proceeding; from it s territ ory :
(b) all s ta t io ns in Antarctica occupied by its nationals; and
(c) any military personnel or equipment intended to be int roduced by it. into Autarct ica s ub jec t to th e cond it io ns prescribed in
paragraph 2 of Art icl e I of [he p resent Treaty,
. \ HTIl:U:

YII [

1. In o rde r to facili t at e t h» e xerc ise o f th eir fun ct ions un der the
prese nt Treaty. a n d w it hout l' n'j lld i C'l~ til th e re spective p os iti on s of
tho Con r ruc r injr Pn rt ics rcl nt i iur to j u r isd ict i-m o ve r a ll ot he r p er~ on s
in Aut .urt ic«, o bse rv ors d l' ~i ~! J:l t l'd unde r p ara!!raph 1 o f .\.rti cle VII
and 5['ie n t ilic perso n nel r-xc luuun» ! umlc r su bpu r.urrn ph 1 (i» of Ar ti cl e
) II of till' T rvut y, an d nu -mber» o f t he sta ll's accomp any ing a ny s uc h
perso ns. s h a ll ht' su bje c t on ly to th e jurisd icti on o f the Cont ra cting
TIAS
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Party of whi ch th ey are nati onals in n -spect o f all ac ts or omi ssi on s
occurring wh ile t hey arc in A nt a rctica fo r th e p llrpo.:e o f exercis ing
their fun ct io ns,
:?, \\' it hout. prejud ice to the provisions o f p :l ra ~ r r:tph 1 of this
Art icle, and pending the adopti on o f measures in (l UI-I UtTl of subparag ra ph l (e ) o f Art ic le IX , th e Con t rac ti ng Parties COl cer ned in
allY case o f d ispute with r egard to the exe rc ise o f ju r isc ict ion ill
A n ta rcrica sha ll inuned i.it ely con s ult togeth er with a view to r ea ching
a rn u t un ll y accl' p t:lb ]e <;o! ut ion ,
ARTICLE

IX

i 'es of the Contracting P art ies named In the. prea mble to th e !JI" ":"llt Treaty sh a ll meet. at the C ity of Canbei
within
L

Represeu '

I

t wo mou ths a fl,' l' t he dat e of en t ry int o force of th e Treaty, and thereafter at. s ui tul .!« inter-val s and places, for the purp 'of ex hanging
information, CO l I. ulring to g ether on matters of common int ' I' st p e tn ining to A ut urc t icu, and formulating and co nsidering, nr U re co )mend ing to t l.e i r G o vern me n ts , mea su res in fu rtl.erun ce of t he pri nci pI es and obj ectiv es o f th e Treaty, in cluding measures regarding:

(a) use of Antarctica for pea ceful pu rposes only;
(b) fa cilitation of sc ie n t i fic res eurch in Anturetica ;
(c) f acilitation of in terna t io na l sci entific. coopera tion in
Ant arcti ca j
(d) fa cili tation of the ex ercise of the right s of ins ct ion provided for in A rlie e V II o f th Trea ty j
(e) qu est ions rel ut ing to th e exerci se of juri Ii tion 111
Antarct ica ;
(f) preservn t ion and con servnt ion of li\'ing re sources In
An tarc t ica.
2, Each Con tract in g Party which h as become a party to the present
Treaty by accessi on under Article XII [ sha ll be entitled [0 appoint
represent atives t o participate in th e meeting s r efer red t o in p:u':lgTaph
1 o f th e present Article, tlm'in" s uc h time as that Con t rnct in« Party
d l'lllolbtmtt's its interest in :\.ntarcti..:a by co nd uct ing sll L~t a n t i a l
sc ient ific research uct i v it v th ere, s uc h a" th e cst.ibl ish mcnr o f 3. scient i fi e ~t a t ion or th e d esjJatc"hof a sc ion t i til.' ex jJl'd it ion,
;3. Reports from th e ob servers referre•.1 to in Article
o f the
present . 'I'ront y shu l l bl' t r.uist u it tcd t o t he rv prvse u tu t ivcs o f th e
t 'o llt ra cti llg Pnrt ies p articipat ing i n th ,· mel' lillg;: referred to in pam:-r ra p h 1 o f th e pre,:pnt ,\r ti .·le,
l. T ill' 111'-:1,,111'<';: rt'f,' IT,'d to ill p :, r:lgra ph 1 o f t h is Art iele sha ll
h l ' I'lIl1 l" p tl'." 1 11' 1' \\-h.' n ap jJl'lj\'"t! lrv :111 1 h., t " lI11 ral'l ill!! Pnrt ies whose
1" 'I'I'l' - "III:lt il'" " 1\', ' 1',' " l!li i lt'd III I;a n il·il' all· in II,,· 1I;" d il 'g'S he ld t o
""/L- id, ' r t hll:'" 11l, ' :I:-li rv- .
.•
,\ 11\' 0 1' :11 1 o f I II . , r i~ h t " l,,,t:\I,li-!,,,c! i ll I hI' 1' 1'1' ':.' 11 1 Tn':\I Y lIIay
l., " "T,·i'.-..d :1" [ rrnu III,: ol a l.· of "11 11'.1' i ll l o f"I" '" o f rln- T reaty
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lie t her or not any mc.r su re s fu c i I it at i ng the exe rr-ise o f s uch l'ighLs
proposed) co ns ilered or :l.ppron'd a" provided in this
A rt icle.

w

h :l n~ been

.\RTl CLE

X

Ea ch of th e Co nr ru ct iug Pa rt ies un .Iert nkes to e xe r t uppropr-iut e
f'fi'o rt" , cons ist en t wit II Il ... ("(:ar tl'r »f rlll: ClI it f'oI \'"fltioll ", to the etul
t ha t 110 0 11(' Pllg "!!" ,; ill 'Illy u ct i vit y ill .\ lI tarc t i l~a co n t rn ry to the
pr incipl es or purposes o f the present Treaty.
"\RTICLE

xr

1. If UIIY d isput e ari se s between two or mo re o f the (''''ltracti ng
Pa rr ie:; co nCI'I'1! i 11I:! t he interpret a t ion 01' a P I icnt io n of t hi' pI ese nt
Treaty, th ose Cont !':1/:t iJlg Part ies s h a ll con su It among t hcmselves with
a vi ew to having the di spute res olv ed by negotiat ion, inquiry, ruediar io n , cnnri l i.rr iou, arbitration, judicial sett leru ent or other peaceful
m eans of t h r jr own choice.
2. "\ ny di -put e of this charact er not so resolved shall, with the
consent, ill each cas e, of all parties to the di spute, be referred to theInt ernational C o u r t o f .l t t iel' for sett lernent ; bu t f : ilu re to reach
agreement on reference to the International Cou r t s h nl l not absolve
parties to the d isp ute from the respon sibil ity of con t inuing to seek to
resolve it by any o f t h e var io u s peaceful means referred to in para:,.rra ph 1 of t hi Art icl .
ARTICI,E

XII

1. (a) The presen t Treaty may be modified or amended at any
time by unanimous agreement of the Contracting Par ti
whoso
represent atives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for
under Art icle IX. Any su ch modification or amendment shall enter
into for ce when the d epos itary Gov ernment has received noti ce from
all such Contracting Parties that they have ratified it.
(b) Such modi ficut ion or nrneudrnr-u s 1;\1 1 thereafter enter
into force as to any ot he r Contracting P a rty whe n notice of ratification by it has bee n received by the d epo- itury (lovernrnent. Anv
suc h C on t r ac ti ng P urt y f' rom whi ch no notice o f r ut ificut ion is re ceived
within a. peri od of t wo : e.t rs from the datE' o f l'n t ry into force o f the
rnodiflcnt ion or nrnend n " Ilt in nccordunce with the provi si on s of
sub p u rnrrru pl. 1 (a) of i It:" .\ rt icle sh a ll be d eemed to 11:1\'1' withdrawn
from th ~ p n' .3 n t Treaty o n the dat e of the e x pi ra t io n of s uch peri od ,
.) ( n ) If aCk r the expiratio n of thirt y y ears from t h-, d a te o f
I'nrry int o forc e of th e. present Treaty, allY of the Contracting I'urt ics
w!t O"l' rPJ)J'f'''''lIt:l l i '. , ·~ are entitl ed to purt icipnt e in the m eeting" providr-d for un .lr-r .\ It i,' k 1 X :' 0 requ est s hy a communication aclrlrl' :':'l'd
to r lie ( 1(' ['().~i t :lI·.v (f O\'erll!lll'nt, :1 Conference of all the Contracting
Pn rt ies sh nll hI' 11l,1t! as soo n ns pruct icnhle to r eview t he opera t ion of
the Trouty .
TI.\S 471'-0
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(b) .\ny mod ilicut iou OJ' n moudureut to tIlt' prt-scnt Tr'ealy
which i" :q l(l"ll\·,.'d at -urh :L ('01\ f .., [l'l 11'1' by :1 mnjurir y of the COli
t ru cr ill;! \' :I!'t il' " t h,'rl' n'jll" _"l'1\ll'd, i 1\I'! u-I: II;! a 11I :ljflri t y 0 f I laoSII WII! l',e
n'I'I'l'" ' ' l ,t .I: : '. ' '' a r,' on r it le.l t o paJ·ticil':1I 1' i ll t lu- 1I1""t illg.-> prov i.I.-d
for unrk-r Yr: i"I.., I X, "hall Ill' "1l11l11l1lIli ' :11 ,',! I " , ( l iP dl'I",,,ilary (;u',,'rll11It'll t ro all I h" l \m I r.u-t i Ill; I 'a rt i e" i 11111 11" l i.i: , !:. ;1 fr 1' 1' IIII.' t er m i /I a t i')1\
i

of till! COllft'p' Il': " alld shall Piller int o f or.,I' i:, :l l 'l" ) i'd a ll \"{~ with l lt n
provi s iou -, of paragraph 1 of t l...· present .\I'l id ,',
Ie)
If n n v
mod if..nt ion or a!!!\' lIol' "I'llt has 1I0t. l'lItl'rtd
iut o for"" ill ael.'l;rd:lli"l' with t lu- prov isi o n-, of .' IlLp a r a g r a p h 1( a ) of
this A rr icle wir hiu a period of t wo j",':Il'S af ll'r rhc date of it ,,; l: O IIl munir.u ion to ali th e Cout ract ing Part ics, allY ('ontr:u~tillg P;Ll1y
Illay at allY t ime u Itvr the expirnr ion of t hat period give not ice to the
.le posi n u -y Gon'I'IIIllI'lIt of its wil hdra wa I from t he pre:".f'lit Trr-ut y;
and s uc h withdru wal shall take etf,'t:l t w» years after the recc ipt of l lu:
not ice by the deposita IT GO\"L'rIlIlH,'nl.

"ll,'"

AHTleu: XIII

1. The present Treuty shall ln.' s ub j ect to rut ificut ion by the signatory Stutes, I shall G\, 0 l ll' lI fur :\l't'\':;sion by any Stall' which is it
~{ell\l>l.'r of 1I1l' { llill.'l! Xut io n s , 01' by nnv other St a ll' wh icl, 111:1\' he
invited to acced e to the Trvnty w it h till! ('~n~nt of a ll tlit' COllL r;ll~ti llg
Parr i-s whose represe nt nt ivos are ent it lcd to parti cipate in the
meet ing-s provided for under .\ rt icle I X of t he Treaty,
,) Rat ifica t ion of or accession to the present Treaty shu \l be
dfe etl"! by each State ill uccotvlnnce with it" cousr in.t ionn] pnlcesses,
3. Iust rumeut s of rut ificut iou awl iust rumeut s of acce:;"ion shall
he dl'!h),:;ih'<1 with the nOH'rn\l\l'llt of t he l-llitl·t! :-;tatl'" of Auunicn,
hpn-by dl'si;!ll:ltl'l! as r he dt'(Jo:'itary c;ll\·i'I"lllll'llt.
-L Th e d"po,:; ital'y Ci0\ -1' I'll 1l11-nI -h .i ll ill t"1l I'll I all ;:ig ll :lt o l'y .1I1l1
:l" ced ill;! :-;tatl's of r he d :lIP of l'adl dl')lll:,it of all in-t rurucnt of rut ifi"ati f>l1 o r :ll'('l',:;sioll, n m] lIn' datI' of oru rv iut o Ior.:« of the Trv.it v n ncl
of ~llY modificut io n o r :lI l:t' lI, l ll ll' ll l th,-! ,,-['II ,
'
;' , {-pOll till' dt'[ll):,i r 'I F iu - t rur ue ur-, "I' r.tt ifi r nt ion by all the " i!!l\:l tory :-:I ;l(l':' , thl' prl' ~' "
f r,':lly shu ll " nt ,-I" into fill''''' fllr rho"e :-:tatl's
n n.l for :-:t:lt" " wh ich I, . ,' d " !'" S:I,'d iu-t ru u u-nt- uf :H "' L':, :,i,)Il, Thorr-,11'11 '1' I !It' '1'1', ' :11 v -h.i l! '' \It,-r lid o flll',-" t"d - :11\ \ - :I" l-, 'd i ll'~ :-:t:1I" HP')ll
t lu- dl'I ,,,,,il "t' i r ~ i n-t : I H . .. · I ! t of ;It'' ·I,,,,,illll.
.
G, TI,l' ['I'I '- \' nt '1' : , .:y ,11,,11 I.t' 1',':.:- :,11'1'1';] 1.,\' t lu- d"l',,_- it:l ry (1'1 \-'
PI'II111l'II t 1'llr - II:1 1l1 III ,\ ;-rid, - 1(1:2 Ill' ll ll' (h.utr-r of t lu- l'lIi'l"! ~ :i1i"II".
,\I:TII'I.F

x rv

T!l l' 1'1"1':-'1'111 Tn· :\t\', dlll l" III !I \I' FIl:.!li "h, Fn·II.-1I, nll :,,,,j:lH :l lld
:-:! ':llJ i,I, 1:II I:.! lIa:.!,-", \:.11'11 \"l'r- ilm !,,' i, ,~ " " I" :l l ly ;11I 11: ,' lIt i,', -h all I",
d" !,,.-i l " d i ll l i,\, :In ,l, i n ' , lit' t l tl' (i" \, ' ;'I :III""l Ill' ,III' '-IIIII',) :-:Ial.,- .. f
\ " ,l 'r :' -:I, \\ 11;, I, - 1" t11 Irall -1I 1it .1111 ,\ ""I'tlt il'd "lIl ,i,<, ,il.'n·.. f (0 rh,'
1 ,1 \ i' f r l ll \1'I I I ... I ll'

, Ill '

. i!....'l l :tf rd ·.' :111, 1 : l .· '· l , il ! l ~ ~1 ;l1(' ...
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RF.PORT OF THE NINTH ANV_RCTIC TREATY CONSULI'ATIVE NEETllIG

I.

Fi na l Re po r t

II.

Recollll!l ~ :ld a'.:i ::ms adopted
Consul~a~ive Meeting

III.

Annex~s

1.

,.
2.

4.

5.
6.

at

l:06

Ninth Antarctic .1'r c;;. r. j

Speeches and Statements made at the

Openi~B

Se6si~n

List ot Participants
Approval of Con9ult~tive Meeting R~coomen D t i ~ ~ ~
Message trom the COnsultative ~etin~ to stati~n~
in the Antarctic
Report ~! the ~orking G~up of Ex?erts on
Exploration and Exploitati~n ~r Antarc~ic r.incrals

~

'.

I

r

Document~ on Tourism sut~itted to the Ninth
Consultative f'leeting and referred to the Tenth
Consultative ~eeting tor further consideration.

I

FINAL

RE~RT

OF Tt.1E NL'i7H ANT,l..RCrrC

TaUT"{

CONSULT.4.TI'IE MEETING

1.
In acc.,rdaoce with the pr-ovi a io as 'Jf Article I:< ot tho
Anterctic Treaty, representatives of the ~nBultative Parties
(Argentina, Australia, 5e~gium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealou~,
Norwal, Poland, the Republic ~f South Africa, the Uni,)l1 ot S-,viet
Socialist Republics, the United lingdom ot Great Britain snd
Northern Ireland and the United States .,f America) met in ~n£Jo
from 19 Septcmberto_?~~~:>b.e.F__
to c"nsult together and
consider measures which might be taken to further the princi~le5
and purposes of the Treaty and, where appropriate, make
recommendations to their ~vernmeots.

1m
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2.
r~ Geo~e ~ll, Repre5ent~t!ve ~f the United Einc1~~.
acted as Te~p?rerj Chalrmeo ~t the r~e~ing pendioS the electiry~
ot a Cbalr::.ilO.
}.

The

P1iniste~

r.eotin~ ~a8

t?rmally ?pened ~ Mr Ted
"t State t')r Forcl:o e:K1 C,)Cl!:n'")n'.'~alth

R~~lBnd9,
Arra~r-s

~r

Y2.
the

Unitc~ Xj,n~d'")'II.

Kr Hall W4S thea
the . !'CO wa$ e;;?.,ioted

~.

FCO was

5.

~ecre';l.ry-G~nel·&l

Assistant SecretBry

Mr J~hn ~81lwo~d Jf
B:ld :-'.r I9n Dunea a '); :::'c

Ge~erol.

The Opening Session .... as held io pub Li c ,

...er
6.

a~?')intcd

~lected Chnir~nn,

or

by the ceads

Tho r.ectins ad?;>ted
1.

Opening?f

2.
,.
4.

E1ccti~Q

5.

6.

7.
8.

9.
10.
11.
12.
1~.

14.

1?
16.

17.

O;cning

~el!!gati.,~s

tb~

(ACU(IX

t~ll"'0/ioe;

O.,e:li:1g g";e:;cr.lcr.t:::
1) •

Agenda:

~oetiog

or orficers

state~eQts

Ad~pti?Q?t agenda
Antnrct ic reaourc es - the que s t i an of mineral
er-ploratbn or.do exp l o i tati.,n (Recon:ne::dati?n VI:i!-1 /1 ,
"pcrativc paragrs;>h 4)
ADtarctic cariDO!! Li vin~ r-e seur-c e s (Recol:'..wc:ldat;i~:l 'iIII -~O,
oporative paragraph 5)
Improvel!leat.,r telcco:n~uniceti.')ns in .\Dtare:;ica lln':! 1:
the collection ~nd distribu~:on 0: meteor1]?gical dot n
Effects ~r tourists and n10 g~ve~ental ~xpeditin~s
Ln the ADtarctic Treaty n.l'ea.
COIQ;>letion of Annexe s ;.
8n~ B t'l Reco:n.rnonj'lti.,n 'JIli-9
Co_"peratioo in tranap1rt (Reco~endatioD VIII-7)
Man's impact on the Antarctic cnvlroOQent
Activities in the ~ntarctic of Rtates that are not
Cootractine ra~ties
D?cument6 of tn~ Consultative r.cetin~s
llcvio ·.. or c-mne rvn c i on lIleasur~s and Si;;tos of Spe c i a I
~cicnti(ic Ioterest
Date and p18c~ of next ~csultativo M~c~ing
Any ~ther bu~icess
Ad'")pti~o of ?inol Rep.,rt
Clos1nb o( ~eetiug

r..

~

• • ....

•

•

~..

~

I ."

~:

::

...
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containing practical guidance tor visitors to the_Antarctic, ~ore
cOl1side~ed tor inclusion in Annex A of Recommendation VIII-9 but,
owing to lack of tiMe for full discussi~n, the matter ~a9 refe~red
to the Tenth Consultative Meet in6.
The drafts are rep~duced
at Annex 6.

No action was takcQ to list or dcf i na areas ~r Spp.cial
Interest for inclusion in Annex B of Rec~mcendation VIII-9.
13.

Mon's impact on the

Ant . ~ ~tic

T~u=i~t

r

envir~nment

~it~ the items on the a genda concerning Antarctic reR0urcp~
particularly in mind, the Rer r esentntivcs discUS3Cd th ~ quc3tion
of man's iopoct OD the Antarctic enyir0n~eDt.
They recalled
the Dumerous steps already taken byC0~5 ultativc Parties desig~ed
to protect the Antarctic environment from unne~es~a~ interference,
including:

The designation by the Consultative Parties of the
Treaty Area as a Special Conservation Area nnd the
-ado pt i on ~t the "Ag r e ed Measures for the ~Dserv8tion
of the Antarctic Fauna and ?l~raw.
(ii)
The desi~ation of "Specially Protected Are3s" to
preserve their unique ec~logical system and "Sites
or Special Scientific Interest" to enable scientific
investigations to be carried out at th~se sites witb~ut
interference.
(iii) The negotiati?n of the Convention for the Con8crvoti~n
of Antarctic Seals (London 1972).
(iv)
The adoption of measures to preserve aDd protect
rrOM damage historic monuwents situated in the
Antarctic Tre8~Y ~rea.
(v)
The ad0pti~n of a Code of G1nduct to be observed
at their stations and by their expeditions within
the Antarctic Treaty Area.
(i)

They also recall that in close co-operation with the
Sc i e n t i f i c Committee on ~ntarctic kese8~ch (~CAR) of the
Interna:ional Council of Sc i e nt i f i c ~nions, and ttrouc h
S C ~ I.itb other appropriate international organisations
conce~ed, they have develored plans for the comprehensive
study of the Antarctic marine ecosyste~ considered as an

. -.

/

integral part
sought to:
(8)

or the

Antarctic enviro~cnt and h~;e

identity the tyoes and assess the extent

?:

buman interference which has occurred in the
Treaty area a8 a result of Mao's activities;
(b)

6sses~ the possible i~pact on the environmp.nt
of the Treaty Ar~3 and other dependent cc~cJ~t~~~
if mineral expl~ra~ion and/or exploitatior. fter~
to occur there.

The Representatives, while ~ Q s i d e r i D ~ the next steps t~
be take::! ~:ith r e ga r-d t~ qu e c t i o rr. c nc e i-n i ng Antarctic r e s ou r-ce s ,
~ecidad to ra~~m~end that ~heir ·~ ~e rnn c u ~ ~ should rG~ffirm
their C'Jmmit::lcnt tr) envir~n"lE:ntB'!. pr-o t cc t i on ,
Acc'JrdinCly tl;1")
Representatives drew up the $tat~~cnt c0ntained in Rec0~mend~ti'ln

ll-5.
14.

Activities in the Antarctic of other sta~es
This ~up.stion was wide17 discussed.
In connection with possible substantial or continuing activities
1n ~he ~~arctic Tr~aty "~ea by States that are not Cor-tracting
ra~ties 0: toe Treaty. the Representatives recalled their agreed
~ie~ expressed in the Final Report of the Seventh Antarctic Treaty
~?r~u]t~tive Mee~i~g that it would be advisable for Governments to
co~~ult to~ether a5 provided for by the Treaty and be ready to urge
or in7ite as B?propriate the State or States concerned to accede to
~r.~ ~re8t7t pointic~ out tte ri~hts and benefits they would receive
3cd ~l~o :he resrcnsibilities and obli~ations of Contracting Parties.
1~

docurnects of Consultative ~eetinfs
The 'It;e~tion of a va i Lab i Li.t y of information and doc urcen t s to
~~~ ~ubllC W~D Jiscussed and it was gener311y a~reed that t~pre
e~~ul~ b~ increased efforts to ~ake both nore available to the
.; .

rCror~"tioc a~d

;:'.lblit: •
11 J

::essu:-es and Si t es of ':[lPcial
:r.terest
:he attention of Hep~esentatives ~as d~a~n to two erro~s in
, <',:c-,r."n1'ltions "i1 I I - 1 'Inc ": :;: : 1-4 r-es pec t i ve l y , The
it e j :- ";, e n t ~ t , v p ,, c ec io eo to c c r re c t r; ne La t i cuc e r hovn on the ~p
.

Re",i" '. of

, ; c i ~ r, : :' :' :.. c

:: (~~servat:'on

attached to RecorD;Dendation V111-1 so as to read 660 _ 16' . S. -- The _
Representatives decided to remove the discrepancy between the
Management Plan tor Site of Special Scientific Interest 1m 6
(attached t~ Rec~~rDendati~n 'i111-4) and the attached cap by
substituting the word "three~ tor the w~rd ~rourn in secti0n (i)
of the r~nRgement Plan.

..

'.~

..

The Meeting c~nsidered the questi0n of the designation
of Marine Sites of Special Scientific Interest Dnd the opini0n
was expressed th~t SCAR should be invit~c to ~x n~ine this
~atter.
In this connecti~n. R er r e s c n t~ t L v es ~ 0 t e d that the
~~ .e rn= en ~ ~ ! Chile intended to p r 0 ~o ~ e ~3 SCA2 . ~ol10wing aereed
procedures, two r~rine Sites of Speci3l Scientific Interest.
The United Sta~es Delegation suc~itted the foll0 wing
information on its experience in Sites 0: Speci~l Ccientiflc
Interest :
Management plans tor seven Sites of Special Scientific
Interest (SSSI) were accepted as interim ~idellnes by
Recommendation VI11-4 in 1975.
The 1976-77 a~5~r8l s~~r
provided the first opportunity to iocorp?rate these guid~liDes
iDto Antarctic operatiDB procedures.

- -,

The existing seven ss:;r expire June 30. 1981. which dnt"
is likely t~ occur betore the el~venth Co08ultative Meeting.
The US Antarctic Progra~ controls visits to 5551 by 9
permit system and has found this to he ao effective MeSDS
of reducing harmful interfereuce atS3ST 1, 2, ~ snd 4 durio~
the 1976-4977 operating se a son ,
'The posting of iofo.nDatbo
si~s around SSS! has been a deterrent to unintend~
interference by tourists.
During ~his initial year or
operati')ns, the US issued one p~r~it for 8cce~s to SSSI.
One request for access to SSSI 3 W~3 denie1 On ~uoda that
tbe propo~ed purp0se was in conflict with the r~r.3ge~eot PlA~
as set forth in Recommendation VIII-4.

1?

Tenth CJnsultAtive

Me~ting

Representatives accepted with pleu~ure the invitation ~f the
of the United Stctes to h)ld the ~ntb Consultativo
Meetiog i.n \....' lshiogton. l:JC i n 1979.
Represent~tive

'f
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IX - 2
ANTARCTIC l1.ARINE LIVING RESOURCES

The Representatives)
Recallin5 the special responsibilities conferred upon the
~nsultative parties in r~spect of the preservation and conserva~io~
of living resources in the Antarctic by virtue of Article IX
paragraph 1(f') of the Antarctic Treaty;
Recalling further the history of action taken by Consultative
Parties concerning conservation and protection of the Anta~ctic
ecosystem including, in particular, Recomcendations III-VIII,
VIII-10, VIII-13 and IX-5i
~otinG thae concencrations of marine living resources are
found in the Antarctic Treaty area and adjacent ~nters;

Aware of the need to compile more infor~ation with a view to
developing a good scientific foundation for appropriate con~ervation
measures and rational management policies for all kltarctic marine
living resources;
Recolinising the urge:.cy of ensuring that these resources are
protected.~ the establis~ent of sound conservation measures ~hich
will prevent overfishlng and protect the integrity of the Antarctic
ecosystem;
Concerned that interim guidelines for the protection and
Conservation of Antarctic marine living resources are desirable
until such time as a definitive re~i~e enters into force;
Convinced that provisio~ for effective measures to conserve
Ar.~~ctic marine living resources as well as for collection and
~r.qlYeiD of the data necessary to develop such measures will reGuirc
'. t, 1':

·:f.lrly conclusion of a definitive conservat.ion regi:ne;
k~r.omoend to their Governments that:

I

SCIEN~IFIC

1.

RESEARCH

To the greatest extent feasible, they cooperate broodly and
compre hens ively in scientific investigations, and in the
exchange of information therp.on, relating to the Antarctic

14

(a)

the regime should explicitly re~ogni8e the prime
responsibilities of the Cons~ltative Parties in rela~io~
to the protection nnd conservation of the environoent in
the Antarctic Treaty area and the importance of the
measures recommended by the Consultative Parties to th~s
end;
t he provisions of Article 4 of the Antarctic Treaty s~atl
not be affected by the regi~e. It should ensure th~~ t~~
principles e~bodied in Article 4 are safe~arded ir.
ap plication to the ~arine areas south of GOO Sout~ latitu~~;

(c)

t he regime should provide for the effective conservatic~
of the marine livi~g resources of tbe A~tarctic ecosJ~tc~
as a whole;

'\ (d)

the regime should cover the area of specific competence
of the Antarctic Treaty;

'--<e)

the regime should. however. extend north of 60 0 South
latitude where that is necessary Cor the effective
conservation of species of the Antarctic ecosystem,
without prejudice to constal state juri~diction in that
area;

' (f )

the regime should not apply to species already re~lated
pursuant to cxistinf, i~ternational agree~ents but s~ould
take into account the "elatio~ship of such speci~s to
those species covered by the regime.

..
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[APPENDIX]

- -- ---

AGREED MEASURES }o'OIl 'l'HE COXSERVATro" OF
ANIl'A-R~l' NA A"n FLORA [']

The Representatives, taking into consideration Article IX. of the
Antarctic Treaty, and recalling Recommendation I-VIII of the F'irst
Consultative ~rl"eting and Rocommendut ion II-II of the Second
Consultative Meeting, recommend to their Governments that they
approve as soon us possible and implement without delay the annexed
··Agreed Mcasm·cs for the Con servation of Antarct ic Fauna and
Flom",
Preamble
The Governments participating in the Third Consultative ~reetill;:;
under Article IX. of the Anturctic Treaty,
De::;iring to implement the principles and purposes of the Antar..r irTrea ty j
U :!eogn ising th e scientific Impcrtance of the study of Antarctic
fuu na a nd Ilorn, t heir adaptation to their rig orous environmen t, ant] their interr slarionsh ip with that environmen t:
Cons ide ri ng th . unique.nature of I hese faun a and flora, their circumpolar nuige, and particularly their defencelessness and suscepti bility
to exte rm ina ion ;
Desiring by uitllel' international collabOration within the f ra mwork of th e Anta rctic Treaty to promote and ach ieve the objective,
of protection, scientific st udy, and rational use of these f auna. a nd
flora' and
Having parti ular regard to the conservation principl s developcd
by the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) of the
International Council of Scientific Unions;
Hereby £21lii lor th Tronty .\.rea as a Special Conservation Area
ami have agreed on (he following meaSUrl':5 :
- Article I
1.

These Agn'e(l ~reasures shall apply to the same area to which the
Antarctic Treat) is upplicuble (hereinafter referred to a" the
Treaty Area) namely the area south of GO° ~outh Latitude,
includiug all ice shelves,
However. nothing in t hesc .\gl"l'el] ~[I'asures shall projudice»r
in any way :tlfe,:! the ri!!!lb, or r he exorcise of till' rights, of all.1State under inn-runt ioua l !:L w wit h n'g:l I'll to t he high ;:,ea,; wirh ill
\ T» hp t'oll :--.id,'·rt'd

111·-1 X.

fiJI/I".

p.

~,~,; .

; 1 ...

i nt r-ri tu ,~ l1 i l l l\

liIH'"

in iH"t'lI r da tu'" wir h

Ht'. -IHUIlII'IHhll i. '1I

i
I

(

.

I

the Treaty Area, or restrict the implementation of the provisions
of the Antarctic Treaty with respect to inspection"
2~The .\nnexes to these Agreed-~.(~as~~ shaii- f~rm an integraTP~t
thereof, and all references to the Agreed Measures shall be
considered to include the Annexes"
Article II
For the purposes of th ese Agreed :\fea::ures:

a)

" Na t ive mammal" means any member, at any stage of its life
cycle, or any species belonging to the Class Mammalia
indigenous to the An ta rctie or occurring there through naturul
agenci es of dispersa l ~ept i ng whale . -

b)

"uut ive bird" n a ils any mem ber, at :mrsrage of its life cycle

(illcluuing etrgs) , of any sp ecies of the Class A ves indigenous
to tho Antarct ic or OCCUlTing there through natural agencies
of dispersal;
C) "native plant" means any kind of vegetation at any stage of
its life cycl e (i ncl uding seeds), indigenous to th e An tar ctic
or occurring tll re th rough nutural agencies of d ispersal ;
d) "appropria te author ity " means any perso n auth orised by a.
Participat ing Govern ment to issue permits un der these Agreed
Measures ;
e) "perm it ' mean a ormal p rm issio n i n writing issued b an
appropriat
I ri;y .
f ) "parti ipating gO\ ernm nt" means any Governmen t for which
these Agreed Measu res have become effective in accorda nce
with Arti cle XIII of these Ag ~ • Ieasures,

,1

Article III
Each Participating Government shall take appropriate action to
carry out the se Agreed ~feasures"
Article IV
Tho Participating Governments shall prepare and circulate to
members of cxpedit ions and stat ions information to ensure under,;t a ll d i n~ uiul obse r va nc e of the provisions of llll':'c Agreed ~Ieasures,
~ l'tt i ng fort h in particular prohibited a ct ivit ies, au .I prodding list s of
~ I" 'l' i :l l l y prot edeJ s pe c ies and spec iu lly prOl el't l'" arcus.
Art iclo Y
Thn provisions o f these .\ g n'cll ~rpa ';lIres shall not apply in ca ses of
«xt 1'l'/Il l ' p!lII'rg pll{'y ill\'oh-illg

r ill '

I."

L

:' :I t'd .'"

1I1l l 0

.;,;"

of s h ips

hi

01"

possible loss of human life

aircraft.

01"

involvinz
t::>
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Articl e VI
1. Each Partieipu till~ Gm"i-I:nment sTIallpn>1IilJit-within the T n":try

Area the killing, wounding, capturing or molesting of any nali\"l~
ma mm al or nnt ive bird, or any attempt at any such act, except in

2"

accordance with a permit.
Sucl: permits shall I.Hl drawn in terms as specific as possible and
iSSIll'l1 only for the following pnrposes:

a)

b)
c)

3_

to pro\'id~.intlispensable rood fo-~ men or dogs in the Treaty
Area in limit ed llUi~ntit.i\'s,:tnli in conformity with the purP05CS and principles of these Agrel'd ~Icasures;
to prO\"ide specimens for scientific study or scientific
in formation;
to provide specimens for museums, zoological gardens, or
other educational or cultural institutions or uses.

Permits for Specially Protected Areas shall be issued only in
accordance with the provisions of Article VIII.

4. Participating Governments shan li mi t. the issu of such permits
so ' to ensur as far as possible tha :
a)

no more n at ive mammals or birds are k illed or taken in any
than ca n normally be re pl aced by natu ral re p roduction
in, the foil wing breeding 5C.'l.SOD ;
t h va rie y of species and he ba ance 0 the natural ecologica
systems e isting within the T aty A.rc:J. . re maintained .
j'e:J.r

b)
5.

The species of nat ive mammal s and b irds listed in Annex: .A of
these )[eas ure" shall be designa ted
pecially P rotected S pecies "
and shall be accorded specia l p ro tection by P a rticipating
Governments,

G.

A Participating Government sha ll not authorise an appropriate
authority to issue n permit with respect to a Specially Protected
Species except. in accordance with paragraph 7 of this Article.

7,

.\. permit may be issued under this Art icle with respect to a
Sp('ci:t1ly Protected Species, provided that :
:1)

I,)

' l is issued for a compclfing scientific purpose, and;
Il le

actions permitted thereunder will not jeopardise the
nn t uru] ('('olog ica l ;;y "ll'm or tlte sur viva l of that

. · ;,.i,.; ~ i n ~
,, ! H'<' IC;;.

Art iel c YH
1.

1-::1<'11 Part icipat iJlg Govcrnmeut shall take appropriate measures
luumful inter ference within th e Treatv Aroa with the
norm.tl living ru nd it ious o f allY nut ive n uunrna l ~I' bird, or any

ttl iuiuimize
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attempt at such harmful interferen ce, except as permitted under

-.

Article VI.
2.- -T he following acts. and acti vities shall J)e_con~iuered as h:~rm:. . ._r lI_I__.
interference:
a)
b)

c)
d)
e)
f)

allowing dogs to run free;
flying helicopters or other aircraft in a manner whi ch would
unnecessarily disturb bird and sea l concentrations, or landing
close to such concentrations (e.g. within 200 metres) ;
driving vehicles unnecessarily close to concent rations of birds
a nd seals (e.g. within 200 metres) ;
use of explosives close to conce nt rations of birds and seals;
di scharge of firearms close to bird and seal concentrations
(e.g. within 300 metres);
any disturbance of bird and seal colonies during the breed ing
period by persistent attention from persons on foot.

However, the above act ivities, with the ex ception of those
mentioned in a) and e) may be permitted to the minimum extent
necessa ry f or the estaLlishm ent, supply and operation of sta tio ns.
3. Each P articipatin g Govern ment shall take a ll reasona le steps
to wards the alleviation of pollution of th e wa ters adjacent to the
coast an d ice shelves.

9ii~~~A rt icle YID
The areas of outstanding scientifi interest listed in nnex n shall
be des ig na ted ' Specially Protected reo
a nd shall
accor ed
special protection by t he Participating Govern ments in order to
preserve their unique natura l ecologi I system.
2. In addit ion to the proh ibitions an d measures of p ro tect ion deal t
with in other Articles of these Agreed ~[e:lSUre5, the Participating
Governments shall in Specially Protected Areas further prohibit :
a)
b)

the collection of any nat ive plant, except in nccordnnce with
a permit;
the driving of any vehicle.

3. A permit issued under Article YI shall not have effect within a
S pec ially Protected Area excep t in accordance with paragraph t
of th e present Article.
4. A permit shnll have effect within a S pec ia ll v Prote ct ed Ar ea
provid ed that :
.
:I)

it was issued for a compe lling scienti fic purpose which ca nnot
be serv ed elsewhcre : und

TI.\$ GO;:;S

-- - -

b) --._the actions permitted thereunder will not jeopardise the
natural ecological systeiuexisfing in that Area.- - - - . - - _
Article

IX

Each Participating Government shall prohibit the bringing into
the Treaty Area of any species of animal or plant not indigenous
to that Area, except in accordance with a penn it.
2. Permits under paragraph 1 of this Article shall be drawn in terms
as specific as possible and sha ll be issued to allow the import at inn
only of the animals and plants listed in Annex C. W hen any such
animal or plant might cause harmful interference with the natural
system if IAt unsupervised within the Treaty Area, such permits
_ shall require that it be kept under controlled conditions and, after
it has served its purpose, it shall be removed from the Treaty Area
or destroyed.
3. Nothing in paragraphs 1 and ~ of this Article sh all apply to the
importation of food into the Treaty Are:l. so long as animals and
pl a nts used for this purpose are kept under controlled conditions.
4.
ach P a rt icipating Go vernment un dertakes to ensu re t ha t all
reasonable precautions shall
taken to prevent the a ident al
introduction of pa rasites and diseuses into the Treaty A rea . I n
particular, the p re au t ions listed in A nne ' D sh 11 be ta ken.
1.

,

I
I

A rt icl
E ach Pn icipat ing Gove rnment undertakes to exert appropriate
efforts, consistent with the Charter of the Uni ted Nations, to the end
that no on engages in any activity in the T reaty Area contrary to
the principles or p ur poses of these Agreed ~ reasu res.
Article XI
Each Participating Government whose expeditions use ships sailing under flags of nationalities other than its own shall, as far as
feasible, arrange with the owners of such ships that the crews of these
ships observe these Agreed :\feusures.
Article XII
1.

The Participating Governments may make such arrangements
may be necessary for the discussion of such matters as :
a)

:IS

th e collecti on and excha nge o f record" (including" records of
permits) un-I st ut ist ies couevr n ing the nu mbers o f cuch spec ies
Ilf nut ive munu na l :lUU bird k ilh«] or ":lIJlllred au uu.rllv ill the
Treaty Area ;
.

.
I

I

i
I
I
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(
L)

2.

the obtainiusr nnd cxclumgc o f iufurtuut ion as to the status of
native mam~als and birds ill tJ!I:l_Trc.uty Area,..aIHLthe exterit - - - ~ - to which :iny species needs protection;
c) the number of native mammals or birds which should be
permitted to be harvested for food, scientific study, or other
uses in the var-ious regions;
d) the establishment of a common form in which this information shall be submitted Ly P urt iciputing Govcrnruents in
uccordance with paragraph 2 of thi s Article,

Each Participating Government shall inform the other Governments in writing before the end of November of ea ch year of the
steps taken and information collected in the preceding period of
July 1st to June 30th relating to the implementation of these
Agreed ~Ieasures. Governments exchanging information under
paragraph 5 of Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty may at the
same tim e transmit the information relating to the implementation
of these Agreed Measures.
Article XIII

1. Aft er the receipt by the Go vernment des ignated in Recommendatio n I-XI (5 ) of not ification of a pp ro val by all GO~'ernmen
whose representa tives a re entitled to participate III meet in gs p ro vided for under Article I X of the Anta rct ic Treaty, these Agreed
easures shall become effect! for those Governmen .
2. T hereafte r an y ot er COntractmg Party to the An nrc ic T reaty
may, in consonance wi th t he purposes of R ecom mendat ion
III-VII, accept th ese Agreed ~rensures by notifying the designa ted Go vernm ent of its in tent ion to apply the A g re
Ieasures
and to be bound by them. The Agreed Measures shall become
effective with regard to such Governments on the date of receipt
of such notification.
3. The designated Government shall inform the Governments referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article of each notification of
approvnl, the effective date of these Agreed :\Ieasures and of each
notification of acceptance. The designated. Government shall also
inform any Government which has accepted these Agreed :\Ieasure s of each subsequent notification of acceptance.
Article XIV
1. These Agreed ~Ieasures may be amended at any time by unanimous

agre('ment of the Governments whose Representatives are entitled
participate in meetings under Article IX of the Antarctic
l'rcnry.

!?
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2. The Annexes, in particular, may be amended as necessary through
diplomut ic .chunnels.
_
3.

An amendment proposed through diplomatic channels shall he
submitted in writing to the designated Government which shall
communicate it to the Governments referred to in paragraph 1. of
the present Article for npproval ; at the same time, it shall be
communicated to the other Participating Governments.
·t Any amendment shall become etlcct ive on the date on whi ch
notifications of approval have been received by the designat ed
Government from ull of the Governments referred to in paragraph
1. of this article.
The designated Government shall notify those same Governmcnj-,
of the date of receipt of each approval communicated to it and the
date on which the amendment will become effective for them.
6. Such amendment shall become effective on that same date for all
other Participating Governments, except those which before the
expiry of two months after that date notify the designated GO\'ernment that they d not accept it.

5.

ANNEXES TO THESE AGREED MEASUR ES

An nex A
Spei~ial1.r protect l'tl s pecies

Annex

n

Specially protected areas

Annex C
Tn:e_~rtation of animals and plauts

The following animal" and plants may be imported into the
Treaty Arou in accordance with permits issued under Article IX
(~) of th ese Agreed )feasures :
a)
I.)
,,)

sledge dogs;
dllllll',;1 ic animals nrul plants;
laboratory unimnl s un .I plants.

TL\S 60::;S

150
Annex

n

Precautions to prevent accidental introdud ion of parasi.tes and
di5easl's into the Treaty Area

The following precautions shall be taken:
1.

Dogs: All dogs imported into the Treaty Area shall be inoculated
against the following di seuses :
a) distemper;
b) contagious can ine hepatitis;
c) rabies
d) leptospirosis (L. canicola and L.
rhagk:w) .

icterohaemor-

Each dog shall be inoculated at least two months before the
time of its arrival in the Treaty Area. .
Poultry: Notwithstanding the provisions of Article IX (3) of
these Agreed Meas urcs, no living poult ry shall be
brought into th e 'I'reutyArea after July 1st 1966.
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